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Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations
admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we pro-
vide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second
part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general axiom relating preferences and probabilis-
tic beliefs which implies that preferences over unambiguous acts are probabilistically sophisticated
and which entails representability of preferences over Savage acts in an Anscombe-Aumann-style
framework. The motivation for an explicit and separate axiomatization of beliefs for the study of
decision-making under ambiguity is discussed in some detail.1. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Ellsberg’s (1961) celebrated experiments, it is by now widely recognized that
decision makers are not always guided by a well-deﬁned subjective probability measure. Ellsberg’s
challenge to received decision theory is particularly profound in that it puts into question not so much
particular assumptions on decision makers’ preference attitudes towards uncertainty, but the very
understanding of uncertainty itself. Even though much eﬀort has gone into modelling of Ellsberg-
style “ambiguity”, the nature and role of probabilistic beliefs in such contexts is not yet understood
satisfactorily. This issue is central not just from the point of view of decision theory itself, but also
from that of its economic applications, since, in large part, economic models are models of agents’
beliefs, whether in macroeconomics, ﬁnance, game theory or elsewhere.
The modelling of an agents’ probabilistic beliefs under ambiguity can be approached in at least two
ways. First, one might try to deﬁne beliefs from preferences following Savage (1954). While Savage’s
own deﬁnition can be invoked even under ambiguity at a purely formal level, it is in general no longer
associated with well-deﬁned probabilistic beliefs, as will be illustrated shortly in the context of the
Ellsberg paradox. The canonical relation between probabilistic beliefs and (betting) preferences that
obtains under expected utility breaks down, since betting preferences are now determined by beliefs
—however construed— and ambiguity attitudes.1 It is an open question whether and under what
circumstances Savage’s deﬁnition can be generalized satisfactorily. And, in any case, it seems likely
that even the “best possible” deﬁnition will be less canonical, that it will come with more strings
attached than Savage’s. In this paper, we therefore want to pursue a less ambitious goal: “Suppose
that we know that the decision-maker entertains a speciﬁed set of probabilistic beliefs. What is the
structure of such beliefs, and how do they (rationally) constrain his preferences?”2
To address these two questions, we propose to model probabilistic beliefs as comparative likelihood
relation D over events, with “A D B” denoting the judgement “A is at least as likely as B”, thereby
1For diﬀerent reasons, a canonical deﬁnition of “revealed subjective probability” from choice-behavior fails to be
possible in the case of state-dependendent preferences; see Karni et al. (1983) and the subsequent literature.
Even in the context of Savage’s SEU theory, this “canonical” deﬁnition has been criticized as not necessarily
capturing the decision maker’s true beliefs (Shervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (1990), Karni (1996), Grant-Karni
(2004) ); this criticism assumes, however, a non-behaviorist point of view to begin with.
2Note that an answer to the ﬁrst question naturally entails an answer to the second: to answer the latter, one
simply needs to check whether the beliefs revealed by his preferences are consistent with the stated set of probabilistic
beliefs. By contrast, as we shall see shortly, an answer to the second question does not necessarily entail an answer
to the ﬁrst. Thus, the second question is more modest and, arguably, more basic.
1following the lead of Keynes (1921), de Finetti (1931) and Savage (1954). This likelihood relation
shall be taken as an independent, non-behavioral primitive, leaving open the question whether/under
what circumstances it can in turn be derived from preferences. We will thus describe a decision
maker by two relations, a preference relation over acts together with a likelihood relation over
events. The likelihood relation can represent either “objective” probabilistic information or purely
subjective beliefs; these interpretations are ﬂeshed out at the beginning of section 2. Under either
interpretation, we will assume the likelihood relation to be incomplete in order to make room for
preferences reﬂecting ambiguity, while preferences are assumed to be complete as usual.
Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs in the Ellsberg Paradox
To illustrate the logic of the proposed preferences-plus-beliefs framework, let us consider the
classical two-color, two urn version of the Ellsberg paradox. One ball is drawn from each of two
urns both of which are composed of red and black balls only. The decision maker is told that the
ﬁrst (“known”) urn contains as many red as black balls, but is told nothing about the composition
of the second (“unknown”) urn. We will focus here on the four events associated with the colors of
each draw: R and B (the ball drawn from the known urn is red / black), as well as R0 and B0 (the
ball drawn from the unknown urn is red / black). There is one fundamental piece of probabilistic
information, namely that the events R and B are equally likely (R ≡ B). According to the typically
observed choice pattern, betting on any color of the known urn is preferred to betting on any color
of the unknown urn:
R ∼ B Â R0 ∼ B0
in obvious notation3.
Comparative likelihood relations constrain betting preferences canonically: if A is at least as
likely as B, then betting on A must be weakly preferred to betting on B. If this condition is satisﬁed
for arbitrary events A and B, preferences and the speciﬁed information/beliefs will be said to be
compatible with each other. We shall refer to the underlying rationality principle that extends to
multi-valued acts as “Likelihood Consequentialism”.
In the above example, preferences are evidently compatible with the speciﬁed information that
R ≡ B. One may wonder, however, whether its is possible to attribute to the decision maker in
3In this notation, an event E is preferred to another event E0 if betting on E (receiving the better of two conse-
quences on E, and the worse on Ec) is preferred to betting on E0.
2addition a belief that red and black from the unknown urn are equally likely, R0 ≡ B0, as implied by
Savage’s deﬁnition of revealed likelihood. Clearly, this can be done only at the price of sacriﬁcing
fundamental coherence properties of the “logic of probability”. For this logic evidently implies that
if a red and black draw from the unknown urn were judged equally likely, then all four possible
draws must be equally likely. But such a judgement would be incompatible with the observed
preference for betting on the known urn. A similar argument shows that the speciﬁed preferences
are not compatible with attributing a belief that R0 is strictly more likely than B0, nor with the
converse belief that B0 is strictly more likely than R0. Thus any coherent likelihood relation that is
compatible with the speciﬁed preferences must be incomplete even though the preference relation itself
is complete.
Incompleteness of the likelihood relation alongside a complete preference relation yields a very
intuitive account of the Ellsberg paradox, in that the absence of a likelihood comparison between
the colors from the unknown urn captures precisely the epistemic diﬀerence between the two urns
that motivates the preference for betting on the known urn. Indeed, this is not a novel interpretation
at all, but simply ﬂeshes out formally the common verbal interpretation starting with Ellsberg (1963)
and Schmeidler (1989).
This beliefs-based approach does not represent the only possible explanation of the Ellsberg para-
dox. A frequently proposed alternative is derived from the claim that the decision maker has well-
deﬁned global subjective probabilities, but simply “dislikes” betting on the unknown urn relative to
b e t t i n go nt h ek n o w nu r n . 4 This alternative, preference-based account allows to maintain complete-
ness of the likelihood relation at the price of sacriﬁcing Compatibility/Likelihood Consequentialism.
This is high price to pay as it severs radically the connection between belief and preference, whereas
here at least a unidirectional version of the classical relationship is preserved.
Representation of Coherent Likelihood Relations by Multiple Priors
The example also illustrates that the content and power of the restrictions induced by a set of
likelihood judgements depends critically on the nature of entailment relationships among them. The
key task of the present paper is therefore the characterization of “coherent” likelihood relations, that
is, of likelihood relations that incorporate all such entailments. For the limiting case of complete
relations, Savage (1954) achieved a characterization of this kind leading to a representation by a
4Segal (1987), Ergin-Gul (2004) and Chew-Sagi (2003) can be interpreted in this vein, as well as perhaps Tversky-
Wakker’s (1995) notion of “source preference”.
3numerical probability measure. This result was in fact a key step in deriving his celebrated Subjective
Expected Utility Theorem. Remarkably, by an appropriate choice of auxiliary conditions, Savage
was able to make do with a single rationality axiom, “Additivity”, according to which the judgment
that A is at least as likely as B entails and is entailed by the judgment that “A or C”i sa tl e a s t
as likely as “B or C”, for any event C disjoint from A and B. In exchange, Savage had to pay the
price of restricting attention to atomless (more precisely: “convex-ranged”) probability measures.
The main result of the present paper, Theorem 2, oﬀers a counterpart to Savage’s result for
incomplete comparative likelihood relations; it appears to be the ﬁrst result of its kind in the
literature. Without completeness, Additivity is no longer enough to fully capture the “logical syntax
of probability”; a second rationality axiom called “Splitting” is needed as well. This axiom requires
in particular that if two events A and B are each split into a more and a less likely “subevent”, and
if A is judged at least as likely as B, then the more likely subevent of A must be at least as likely
as the less likely subevent of B. Under appropriate auxiliary conditions, Theorem 2 shows that a
likelihood relation satisﬁes Additivity and Splitting if and only if it has a representation in terms of
a set of admissible probability measures (“priors”); according to this representation, an event A as
at least as likely as B if and only if A’s probability is at least as large as that of B, for any admissible
prior in the set. Likelihood relations for which such a multi-prior representation exists will be called
coherent.
As in Savage, and indeed in a somewhat more pronounced form, there is a price to be paid for the
simplicity in the rationality axioms underlying coherence due to the need for substantive structural
assumptions. Speciﬁcally, we assume that any event can indeed be split into two equally likely
subevents (roughly as in De Finetti 1931). Besides non-atomicity, Equidivisibility thus assumes a
minimal degree of completeness of the likelihood relation. It is satisﬁed, for example, in the presence
of a continuous random device, as assumed in the widely-used Anscombe-Aumann framework. In an
important sense, Equidivisibility is not really restrictive at all since any coherent likelihood relation
can be extended to a larger one incorporating a hypothetical random-device on a larger state space.
See section 2 for details and further examples.
Importantly, Equidivisibility ensures uniqueness of the multi-prior representation (within the class
of closed, convex sets of priors). We show by example (see section 2.4) that this assumption cannot
be greatly weakened without losing uniqueness. Without uniqueness, a representation of imprecise
beliefs by sets of priors could be viewed as more expressive than a representation in terms of com-
parative likelihood relations; this would cast doubt on the adequacy of such likelihood relations as
4the canonical primitive representing probabilistic beliefs.
Preferences Constrained by Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs
In the second part of the paper, we try to determine how speciﬁed imprecise probabilistic beliefs ra-
tionally constrain preferences. To do so, we propose an axiom called “Likelihood Consequentialism”
that extends the compatibility requirement that has been formulated above for betting preferences
in a natural way to general acts with multiple outcomes. It represents a minimal yet generally
applicable criterion of consequentialist rationality relating preferences to probabilistic beliefs. It is
minimal in that it does not constrain the DM’s risk or ambiguity attitudes in any substantive way,
thereby ensuring behavioral generality. In particular, it accommodates Allais- and Ellsberg-style
choice patterns, and is not tied to assumptions about functional form. As argued compellingly by
Machina-Schmeidler (1992) and Epstein-Zhang (2001), behavioral generality is important since issues
about the representation of probabilistic beliefs are more fundamental than particular behavioral
assumptions. We view the existence of substantive yet behaviorally general rationality restrictions
on preferences as a crucial advantage of likelihood relations as an epistemic primitive (in contrast
to, for example, a direct use of sets of priors).
While minimal, the restrictions on preferences entailed by Likelihood Consequentialism are sub-
stantial. In particular, we show that, given a likelihood relation satisfying the assumptions of The-
orem 2, Likelihood Consequentialism entails probabilistic sophistication over unambiguous (risky)
acts in the sense of Machina-Schmeidler (1992), that is: acts whose outcomes have well-deﬁned prob-
abilities derived from the likelihood relation. Taking the argument further, we show that any such
preference ordering can be represented as a preference ordering over Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts
with a mixture-operation that is deﬁned in terms of the given likelihood relation. This construction
can be viewed as a decision-theoretic, belief-based foundation for the Anscombe-Aumann (1963)
framework. Our derivation not only clariﬁes the assumptions on preferences and beliefs implicit in
the Anscombe-Aumann model, it leads to an even more powerful structure since all uncertainty is
treated at the same level. Moreover, since it applies to any likelihood relation with a convex-ranged
representation, our derivation does not presuppose the existence of a continuous random device.
Likelihood relations represented by convex-ranged sets of priors promise to provide a fruitful
setting for further decision theoretic analyses. Indeed, in companion papers (Nehring 2001, 2004),
we use this framework to address three basic issues in the theory of decision making under ambiguity:
51. how to infer beliefs from preferences;
2. how to characterize decision-makers that depart from subjective expected utility exclusively
for reasons of ambiguity; and
3. how to deﬁne ambiguity attitudes in terms of betting preferences only to ensure behavioral
generality.
In each case, the additional structure provided by a convex-ranged sets of priors is crucial.
Related Literature
1. Our ﬁrst main result, Theorem 2, builds on and can be viewed as the likelihood counterpart
of the multiple-prior representations of partial orderings due to Bewley (1986) and Walley (1991)
following Smith (1961). All of these, however, use preferences as their primitive5 and derive the
multiple-prior representation together with expected-utility maximization with respect to those pri-
ors, and thus fail to be behaviorally general. Mathematically, the objects of the present paper
(orderings over sets) have in general much less structure than the objects in these contributions
(orderings over random variables), which allow the use of vector-space techniques such as separation
theorems. This diﬀerence probably explains why there do not exist counterpart results for likelihood
relations in the literature up to now in spite of the suggestive parallelism. The key technical insight
of the present paper is precisely the realization that it is possible to formulate simple, epistemi-
cally well-motivated axioms that allow to canonically extend a likelihood ordering over events to an
ordering over real-valued functions, thereby making the existing characterizations applicable; the
construction of the extension itself is non-trivial.6
2. In terms of overall motivation of axiomatizing an epistemic primitive, a closely related contri-
bution in the literature is Koopman (1940a and b). Koopman presents an axiomatic treatment of
comparative conditional likelihood relations, whose primitive compares event pairs (“A given B is
at least as likely as C given D”). Koopman’s results are much weaker, however, than the results
of the present paper: while Koopman provides suﬃcient conditions for the existence of lower- and
5Walley and Smith do so by taking “acceptable gambles” as their primitive notion.
6Multiple-prior representations of complete preference orderings have obtained by Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989), Ghi-
rardato et al. (2004) and Casadesus et al. (2000); again, these are about preferences, not belief, and are behaviorally
quite restrictive.
6upper-probability functions that are additive on the class of events where the two coincide, he has
no representation theorem and no characterization of coherence. It is also not clear how conditional
likelihood comparisons are to be related to behavior.
3. There is a sizeable literature on comparative likelihood relations that is mainly focused on
the complete case; see Fishburn (1986) and Regioli (1999) for surveys. In the incomplete case, one
can use standard arguments from the theory of linear inequalities to obtain a characterization of
coherence for likelihood relations deﬁned on arbitrary families of sets; see Walley (1991 p. 192-3) and
related earlier results by Heath-Suddert (1972) and, in the complete, ﬁnite-state case, Kraft-et-al
(1959). In view of the combinatorial complexity7 and algebraic character of the conditions, such
characterizations have generally not been considered to be of signiﬁcant foundational interest (c.f.
e.g. Regioli 1999).
Furthermore, the important uniqueness issue has not been addressed before outside the complete
case. Indeed, it seems fairly remarkable a priori that likelihood relations can match multi-prior
representations in their expressiveness at all; we are not aware of any hint of this in the literature;
see, for example, the discussion in Walley (1991, pp. 191-197) which appears to suggest the opposite.
In sum, in spite of existence of the multi-prior representation results dating back to Smith (1961),
the extant results in the literature on likelihood relations do not seem to come close to those of the
present paper.
4. Some of the recent literature on decision making under ambiguity can be read as oﬀering
proposals for characterizing a decision maker’s unconditional probabilistic beliefs directly through
deﬁnitions of “unambiguous events” revealed by the preference relation; see Epstein-Zhang (2001),
Ghirardato-Marinacci (2002) and Nehring (1999)). Of these, only Epstein-Zhang (2001) strives to be
behaviorally general. Any such deﬁn i t i o nc a nb eu s e dt od e ﬁne a compatibility requirements between
preferences and explicitly given unconditional probabilistic beliefs. In Appendix 1, we point out some
limitations of the Epstein-Zhang deﬁnition from this perspective.8 Thus, even for the special yet
fundamental case of unconditional probabilistic beliefs, no generally applicable criterion of preference
compatibility with such beliefs is available in the literature.
7In particular, the rationality axioms involve ﬁnite families of events whose cardinality is only bounded by the
cardinality of the state space; moreover these families need not have any simple set-theoretic structure.
8Epstein-Zhang’s (2001) primary goal appears to be a behavioral separation of risk and ambiguity, rather than a
behavioral deﬁnition of probabilistic unconditional beliefs.
7Overview
Section 2 characterizes likelihood relations with a convex-ranged multi-prior representation (The-
orem 2), illustrates the central structural assumption of Equidivisibility/convex-rangedness with a
number of examples, shows that uniqueness may easily be lost in its absence, and distinguishes
“coherent” (deductively closed) from “consistent” (non-contradictory) likelihood relations.
In Section 3, we formulate a behaviorally general rationality requirement relating preferences to
beliefs, “Likelihood Consequentialism”. It entails probabilistic sophistication over unambiguous acts
(Proposition 1) and leads to a representation of preferences in an Anscombe-Aumann framework
(Proposition 2). Even in simple cases such as preferences with a multi-prior representation, the im-
plications of Likelihood Consequentialism are not straightforward (Proposition ??). While bounded
rationality considerations may motivate a weakening of coherence to consistency, this may lead to
major losses in the bite of Likelihood Consequentialism (Example 5).
Section 4 mentions possible rationality conditions that go beyond Likelihood Consequentialism,
and discusses the applicability of this principle if preferences are state-dependent. We conclude by
pointing out how the analysis of this paper can be utilized from the standard strict behaviorist
position that does not admit beliefs as independent primitives.
The ﬁrst part of the Appendix discusses the relationship of the present work to the work on
unambiguous events by Zhang (1999) and Epstein-Zhang (2001); the second part of the Appendix
contains all proofs.
2. COHERENT LIKELIHOOD RELATIONS
A decision maker’s probabilistic beliefs shall be modelled in terms of a partial ordering D on
an algebra of events Σ in a state space Ω, his “comparative likelihood relation”, with the instance
A D B denoting the DM’s judgment that A is at least as likely as B. We shall denote the symmetric
component of D (“is as likely as”) by ≡, and the asymmetric component by B . The comparative
likelihood relation can be viewed as representing a not necessarily exhaustive set of probabilistic
judgments attributed to the DM, his explicit probabilistic beliefs.
82.1 The Likelihood Relation as a Primitive
The inclusion of beliefs among the primitives is a likely source of controversy, as it goes against
the grain of the reigning Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage tradition. Precisely because we do not want to
belittle the methodological and philosophical issues at stake, we defer their discussion to future work.
In its place, we submit that both common sense and the practice of economic modeling support an
independent, non-derived role for beliefs: as real-world actors, we prefer certain acts over others
because we have certain beliefs rather than others; as economic modelers, we typically attribute to
economic agents particular preferences over uncertain acts because we have some idea about the
beliefs that can be plausibly attributed to the agents in a particular situation. In both cases, we
think directly in terms of beliefs rather than prefere n c e s .T h i si st h ei n t u i t i v es u b s t a n c eo fi n c l u d i n g
the decision maker’s probabilistic beliefs among the primitives.
The likelihood relation can be given two primary interpretations. First, the likelihood relation may
summarize information about the unconditional, conditional or comparative probabilities available
to the decision maker. Such information arises naturally in various contexts. For example, as we shall
explain in section 2, the notion of an independent random device with known objective probabilities
that is at the heart of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework can be usefully modeled in this
way. Similarly, information about the composition of urns in the context of Ellsberg experiments
represents important probabilistic information. Likewise, if the decision maker observes independent,
identical repetitions of a sampling experiment with unknown parameters (e.g. tosses of the same coin
with unknown bias), this information about the structure of the sampling process can be captured
by a comparative likelihood relation that embodies “exchangeability” a la de Finetti (1937). On the
information interpretation, a likelihood relation will be almost always incomplete, since the decision
maker will possess information only about the likelihood of some events but not of others.
Secondly, the likelihood relation can serve to represent the decision maker’s subjective beliefs,
whether or not these are based on “given” information. Here, beliefs as an independent (non-
behavioral) datum are to be understood as “propositional attitudes”, that is: as dispositions to
aﬃrm certain likelihood-judgments in thought or in speech, in addition to preferences which can be
viewed as dispositions to act. The beliefs need not be speciﬁed exhaustively. That is, the decision
maker may “have” further beliefs that have not yet elicited and recorded in D, but which may
be veriﬁed either by further elicitation (e.g. via interrogation) or revelation through preferences.
Indeed, probabilistic information in the sense above can be understood as a special case of non-
9exhaustively speciﬁed probabilistic beliefs. To highlight the generally non-exhaustive character of
the speciﬁed likelihood relation, we sometimes refer to it as describing the decision maker’s explicit
probabilistic beliefs.
2.2 Savage’s Probability Theorem
As a reference point, we brieﬂy review Savage’s Probability Theorem which delivers a unique
representation of complete comparative likelihood relations in terms of ﬁnitely additive probabilities.
The following axioms are canonical for comparative likelihood in any context; disjoint union is
denoted by “+”.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) D is transitive and complete.
Axiom 2 (Nondegeneracy) Ω B ∅.
Axiom 3 (Positivity) A D ∅ for all A ∈ Σ.
Axiom 4 (Additivity) A D B if and only if A+C D B+C ,f o ra n yC such that A∩C = B∩C = ∅.
Additivity is the hallmark of comparative likelihood. Normatively, it can be read as saying that
in comparing two events in terms of likelihood, states common to both do not matter. It is well-
known that, on ﬁnite state-spaces, Additivity is far from suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of
a probability-measure representing the complete comparative likelihood relation; see Kraft-Pratt-
Seidenberg (1959). Savage (1954) realized, however, that Additivity suﬃces for the characterization
of convex-ranged probability measures;9 the probability measureπ is convex-ranged if, for any
event A and any α ∈ (0,1), there exists an event B ⊆ A such that π(B)=απ(A). Evidently,
convex-ranged probability measures exist only when the state-space is inﬁnite. We state a version of
his result for the sake of comparison. It requires two more axioms; the event A is non-null if A B ∅.
Axiom 5 (Fineness) For any non-null A there exists a ﬁnite partition of Ω {C1,...,Cn} such that
for all i ≤ n, A D Ci .
Axiom 6 (Tightness) For any A,B such that B B A there exist non-null events C and D such
that B\D B A ∪ C.
9This result was in fact a crucial ﬁrst step in his famous characterization of SEU maximization, Addivity of the
“revealed likelihood relation” being a consequence of the Sure-Thing Principle.
10Theorem 1 (Savage) Let Σ be a σ-algebra. The likelihood relation D satisﬁes Axioms 1 through
6 if and only if there exists a (unique) ﬁnitely additive, convex-ranged probability measure π on Σ
such that for all A,B ∈ Σ :
ADB if and only if π(A) ≥ π(B).
An important feature of Savage’s result is the uniqueness of the representing probability. It justiﬁes
the view that the comparative likelihood relation captures the DM’s beliefs fully. Uniqueness is non-
trivial and holds only rarely in ﬁnite state-spaces.
2.3 Dropping Completeness
To allow for imprecision in explicit beliefs, likelihood relations will now allowed to be incomplete.
Axiom 7 (Partial Order)10 D is transitive and reﬂexive.
A main achievement of Savage’s Probability Theorem is its reliance on Additivity as the sole
axiom capturing the logical syntax of probability. If the completeness assumption is dropped, this
seems no longer feasible. For example, while under completeness, one can use Additivity to infer
that if two events are equally likely to their respective complements, they must be equally likely to
each other, this no longer follows without completeness. Yet such an implication seems necessary
for a proper likelihood interpretation of the relation. More generally, the following second rationality
axiom called “Splitting” seems intuitively compelling.
Axiom 8 (Splitting) If A1 + A2 D B1 + B2,A 1 D A2 and B1 D B2, then A1 D B2.
In words: If two events are split into two subevents each, then the more likely subevent of the
more likely event is more likely than the less likely subevent of the less likely event. In the proof of
the following Theorem, we will only make use of the special case in which the two events are split
into equally likely subevents.
Signiﬁcantly, Splitting is not a conceptually independent addition to Additivity, but merely com-
pensates for the missing completeness of the likelihood relation, in that any additive completion of
a given likelihood relation satisﬁes Splitting automatically.
Fact 1 For any weak order D, Additivity implies Splitting.
10Technically, the proper label would be “preorder”.
11Fact 1 shows that Splitting appeals to the same ordinal, qualitative intuition that makes the
Additivity axiom so compelling. By contrast, the linear-programming inspired conditions of Heath-
Suddert (1972) and Walley (1991 p. 192-3) already appeal to a cardinal notion of subjective proba-
bility, as a result of which their foundational value seems to be rather limited.
By themselves, Additivity plus Splitting are not enough to deliver an interesting representation,
as the case of complete likelihood relations on a ﬁnite state-space shows. We thus make the following
structural assumption, according to which any event can be split into two equally likely parts.11
Axiom 9 (Equidivisibility) For any A ∈ Σ, there exists B ⊆ A such that B ≡ A\B.
Very broadly, Equidivisibility can be viewed as an assumption that the likelihood relation is
suﬃciently rich in likelihood comparisons. The axiom can be motivated, for example, by the existence
of a rich set of independent random events. To see this, let T be an event with an unambiguous
probability of 0.5, i.e. such that T ≡ Tc. Then A is naturally viewed as independent from T if this
judgment is maintained conditional on the occurrence of A, that is if A∩T ≡ A∩Tc. Clearly A∩T
and A ∩ Tc split A into two equally likely parts. Note that the plausibility of the existence of such
events does not depend on whether or not the event A itself is unambiguous.
Finally, Savage’s Fineness and Tightness axioms are no longer adequate to obtain a real-valued
representation. In their stead, a condition expressing the notion of “continuity in probability” is
needed. It relies on the following notion of a “small”, “ 1
K − ”event: A is a 1
K−event if there exist
K mutually disjoint events Ai such that A E Ai for all i. A sequence of events {An}n=1,..,∞ is
converging in probability to the event A if, for all K ∈ N there exists nK ∈ N such that for all
n ≥ nK the symmetric diﬀerence An4A is a 1
K−event.
Axiom 10 (Continuity) For any sequences {An}n=1,..,∞ and {Bn}n=1,..,∞ converging in proba-
bility to A and B respectively,
An D Bn for all n implies A D B.
T h e s ea x i o m se n s u r et h ee x i s t e n c eo famulti-prior representation, i.e. the existence of set of
ﬁnitely additive probability measures Π ⊆ ∆(Σ) such that, for all A,B ∈ Σ :
ADB if and only if π(A) ≥ π(B) for all π ∈ Π. (1)
11Equidivisibility is non-trivially weaker than the similar older assumptions of De Finetti (1931) and Koopman
(1940a), according to which any event can be split in arbitrarily many (e.g. 17) equally likely parts.
12Likelihood relations for which such a representation exists will be called coherent.
Note that if D satisﬁes (1) for some set of priors Π, then it satisﬁes (1) also for the closed convex
hull of Π (in the product or “weak∗”-topology which will be assumed throughout). Thus, it is
without loss of generality to assume Π to be a closed convex set; let the class of all closed (hence
compact), convex subsets of ∆(Σ)b ed e n o t e db yK(∆(Σ)).
Note also that all axioms except Equidivisibility but including Continuity12 are implied by the
existence of a multi-prior representation. Equidivisibility imposes further constraints on the set of
priors Π.O n σ-algebras, it is equivalent to the following “convex-rangedness” condition on Π;i f
Σ is merely an algebra, it is equivalent to “dyadic convex-rangedness”.13 Let D denote the set of
dyadic numbers between 0 and 1, i.e. of numbers of the form α =  
2k, where k and   are non-negative
integers such that   does not exceed 2k.
Deﬁnition 1 As e to fp r i o r sΠ is convex-ranged if, for any event A ∈ Σ and any α ∈ (0,1), there
exists an event B ∈ Σ,B⊆ A such that π(B)=απ(A) for all π ∈ Π. The set Π is dyadically
convex-ranged if this holds for all α ∈ D.
Note that while convex-rangedness of Π implies the convex-rangedness of every π ∈ Π, the converse
is far from true. Moreover, as established by Fact 5 in the Appendix14,o nσ-algebras dyadic convex-
rangedness and convex-rangedness coincide.
The following is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 Ar e l a t i o nD on an event algebra Σ has a multi-prior representation with a dyadically
convex-ranged set of priors Π if and only if it satisﬁes Partial Order, Positivity, Nondegeneracy,
Additivity, Splitting, Equidivisibility and Continuity. The representing Π is unique in K(∆(Σ)).
12The necessity of Continuity follows from observing that, for any D with representing set Π, any π ∈ Π and any
1
K−event A, π(A) ≤ 1
K;i fΠ is convex-ranged as deﬁned just below, the converse holds as well.
In contrast to Continuity, neither Tightness nor Fineness are entailed by coherence, even under completeness.
While Tightness is implied by coherence and Equidivisibility, Fineness is not; indeed, it is not diﬃcult to verify that
a coherent and equidivisible relation is ﬁne if and only if, for all A ∈ Σ :m i n π∈Π π (A) = 0 implies maxπ∈Π π (A)=0 ,
w h i c hi nt u r ni se q u i v a l e n tt ot h ec o ndition that all admissible priors π ∈ Π h a v et h es a m en u l l - e v e n t s .W h i l ev a c u o u s l y
satisﬁed in the precise case of a singleton set Π, this condition is clearly quite restrictive when beliefs are imprecise.
13The generality added by allowing Σ to be an algebra is signiﬁcant since algebras can often be described explicitly
while σ-algebras typically cannot. We note that Savage’s Theorem has only very recently been extended to algebras
by Kopylov (2003).
14Fact 5 is presented as a corollary of Lemma 13.
13We shall sketch the proof idea of Theorem 2 with a bit of “reverse engineering”. The key is the
derivation of a vector-space-like structure of the event-space resulting from the convex-rangedness
of the set of priors. Speciﬁcally, one can extend every coherent likelihood relation represented by
t h ec o n v e x - r a n g e ds e to fp r i o r sΠ to a partial ordering on the domain Z of ﬁnite-valued functions
Z : Ω → [0,1] by associating with each function Z an equivalence class [Z]o fe v e n t sA ∈ Σ as follows.
Let A ∈ [Z] if, for some appropriate partition of Ω {Ei},Z =
P
zi1Ei, and such that, for all i ∈ I
and π ∈ Π : π (A ∩ Ei)=ziπ (Ei). It is easily seen that for any two A,B ∈ [Z]:π(A)=π(B)f o r
all π ∈ Π, and thus A ≡ B. One therefore arrives at a well-deﬁned partial ordering on Z, denoted
by b D, by setting
Y b DZ if and only if A D B for some A ∈ [Y ]a n dB ∈ [Z].
It is easily veriﬁed that this ordering satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(Additivity) Y b DZ if and only if Y + Xb DZ + X for any X,Y,Z ,( 2 )
and
(Homogeneity) Y b DZ if and only if αY b DαZ for any Y,Z and α ∈ (0,1].
Moreover, it is positive, non-degenerate and continuous.15 In the sequel, we shall refer to partial
orderings on Z satisfying these ﬁve conditions as coherent expectation orderings. By well-known
results due to Walley (1991) and Bewley (1986, for ﬁnite state-spaces), coherent expectation order-
ings admit a unique representation in terms of a closed, convex set of priors; cf. Theorem 3 in the
appendix.
The actual proof of Theorem 2 proceeds by constructing this extension from the given likelihood
relation and by deriving the properties of the induced relation from the axioms on the primitive
relation. In a ﬁnal step, we invoke the just-quoted Theorem to obtain the desired multi-prior
representation. The proof is non-trivial and requires a surprising amount of work due to the gap
between the ordinally formulated axioms and the cardinal character of the derived conditions.16
15See Appendix, Lemma 9, for formal deﬁnitions.
16In principle, one could conceive of coherent expectation orderings as epistemic primitives. This, however, would
run into the following two problems. On the one hand, the meaning of a comparison of random variables in terms
of their expectation seems intuitively not clear; it seems doubtful that a non-behavioral epistemic primitive can be
based on a complex, mathematically structured implicit expectation operation. It is thus not suprising that Walley
(1991), for example, consistently adopts a behavioral interpretation of coherent expectation orderings (respectively
their counterpart in his work, “lower previsions”) in terms of acceptability of gambles.Moreover, unless one assumes
expected-utility maximization, as both Walley and Bewley do, the link between expectation orderings and preferences
142.4 Uniqueness of the Multi-prior Representation and the Expressive Adequacy of
Likelihood Relations
The uniqueness part of the multi-prior representation in Theorem 2 is non-trivial and signiﬁcant,
as it ensures the expressive adequacy of likelihood relations as an epistemic primitive. Indeed, it is
n o ta ta l lo b v i o u sap r i o r ithat likelihood relations are suﬃciently expressive as primitive carriers
of imprecise probabilistic beliefs. Indeed, in ﬁnite state spaces, likelihood relations seem evidently
defective in this regard, and there is no indication in the existing literature that this situation can
be remedied in a systematic fashion in inﬁnite state spaces.
Analogously to the complete case in which uniqueness of the representing prior is a natural heuris-
tic criterion of adequate expressiveness, uniqueness of the representing closed and convex set of priors
is a natural yardstick of adequate expressiveness in the more general incomplete case. While it can
be shown that Equidivisibility is not strictly necessary to achieve uniqueness, it does not seem possi-
ble to weaken this assumption greatly and still obtain uniqueness in a robust manner. In particular,
non-atomicity-like conditions in the manner of Savage’s Fineness and Tightness conditions are not
nearly enough as shown by the following example.
Let Σ denote the Borel-σ-algebra on the unit interval with Lebesgue measure λ,a n dﬁx K>1,
and deﬁne a coherent likelihood relation DKas follows:
A DK B if and only if λ(A\B) ≥ Kλ(B\A). (3)
With K>1, DK is clearly not equidivisible; in particular, DK does not admit any unambiguous
event with probability diﬀerent from 0 or 1. It is easily veriﬁed that the associated set of admissible
priors Π(DK) (which we shall also denote as ΠK
1 ) consists of all probability measures π with Lebesgue
density φ such that esssupω∈[0,1] φ(ω) ≤ K essinfω∈[0,1] φ(ω);17 in particular, the extreme points of
ΠK
1 consist of all probability measures πD with density φD, where D ranges over Σ with 0 <λ (D) <






1+(K−1)λ(D) if ω ∈ D,
1
1+(K−1)λ(D) if ω/ ∈ D.
Let ΠK
2 ⊆ ΠK
1 denote the closed, convex hull of {πD|λ(D)= 1
K+1}; the following Fact states that
ΠK
2 induces the same likelihood relation DK. Yet, as described in the following Fact that is easily
is not clear. Expectation orderings are thus not viable as a behaviorally general vehicle for describing a decision
maker’s imprecise probabilistic beliefs.
17esssup and essinf denote the essential supremum and essential inﬁmum, respectively.
15veriﬁed, ΠK
1 and ΠK





Fact 2 i) D(ΠK
2 )=DK;












2K λ(A) if λ(A) ≤ K
K+1,
1 − K+1
2 (1 − λ(A)) if λ(A) ≥ K
K+1.




2,K(A) are shown in the following ﬁgure as functions of




2,K and touching at λ = 3
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Fig. 1: Two Diﬀerent Lower Probabilities
For K>1, DK clearly satisﬁes Savage’s Fineness and Tightness conditions. Note that if K is
close to 1,all admissible probabilities are uniformly close to the Lebesgue measure; nonetheless,
u n i q u e n e s si sl o s t .
2.5 Examples of Equidivisibility
The key structural assumption behind Theorem 2, Equidivisibility, is fairly strong. While it implies
Fineness in the presence of Continuity, the converse is not close to being true as just illustrated,
unless the likelihood relation is complete. Whereas Fineness is in substance a strong non-atomicity
16condition, Equidivisibility assumes in addition that the likelihood relation is suﬃciently complete.
It is further illuminated by means of the following speciﬁce x a m p l e s .
Example 1 (Limited Imprecision, Social Belief Aggregation). One way to make the
intuition of a limited extent of overall ambiguity precise is to assume that Σ is a σ-algebra and that
Π i st h ec o n v e xh u l lo faﬁnite set Π0 of non-atomic, countably additive priors. Due to Lyapunov’s
(1940) celebrated convexity theorem, Π is convex-ranged. The priors π ∈ Π0 can be interpreted
as a ﬁnite set of hypotheses a decision-maker deems reasonable without being willing to assign
probabilities to them.
Finitely generated sets of priors also occur naturally in social belief aggregation, where DI repre-
sents the unanimity likelihood ordering induced by the ﬁnite set of individuals’ likelihood orderings
Di that are assumed to be precise with representing measures µi. Assume that social decisions are
based on a precise likelihood ordering DI represented by some measure µI that respects unanimity
in beliefs. Then Theorem 2 implies that Π(DI) = co{µi}i∈I;t h e“ s o c i a lp r i o r ”µI must therefore be
a convex combination of individual priors.18
Example 2 (Missing Information).
In some situations, ambiguity may only concern certain aspects of the state-space, and beliefs
conditional on knowing these aspects may be precise. Formally, suppose that conditional on each
event A in some ﬁnite partition P of Ω, the DM’s beliefs are described by a convex-ranged probability
measure µA;t h a ti s ,f o ra n yπ ∈ Π and any A ∈ P, π(./A)=µA or π(A)=0 . T h e nΠ is clearly
convex-ranged, however imprecise the DM’s beliefs about the events in P may be.
Example 3 (External Randomization Device)
As a variant of example 2, consider state-spaces with a continuous randomization device in the
manner of Anscombe-Aumann. Speciﬁcally, consider a state space that can be written as Ω =
Ω1 ×Ω2, where the space Ω1 is the space of “generic states” , and Ω2 that of independent “random
states” with associated algebras Σ1 and σ-algebra Σ2. The “continuity” and stochastic independence
of the random device are captured by a coherent likelihood relation DAA deﬁned on the product
algebra Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 that satisﬁes the following two conditions, noting that any A ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 can
be written as A =
P
i Si × Ti, where the {Si} form a ﬁnite partition of Ω1.
18This corollary to Theorem 2 is related to a result by Gilboa-Samet-Schmeidler (2004), who derive from social
respect for unanimous indiﬀerences a representation of the social prior as an aﬃne linear combination of individual
priors.




i Si × Ti DAA
P
i Si × T0
i if and only if, for all i ∈ I, Ω1 × Ti DAA Ω1 × T0
i.
While the ﬁrst condition ensures the existence of a convex-ranged probability measure π2 over
random events, the second describes their stochastic independence. By AA1 and AA2, it is easily
veriﬁed that DAA satisﬁes all the assumptions of Theorem 2 including Equidivisibility. Hence there
exists a unique set of priors ΠAA representing DAA; indeed, ΠAA is simply the set of all product-
measures of the form π1 × π2, where π1 can be any ﬁnitely additive measure on Σ1, reﬂecting the
stochastic independence of the random device.
The relation DAA may play the role of a background context that allows the speciﬁcation of beliefs
about “generic” events (Anscombe-Aumann’s horse-races) which may be the only events of direct
interest. For example, the belief that an event A has unconditional probability α can be expressed
as the likelihood judgement A ≡ Ω1 × T, where T is any random event with π2 (T)=α. More
generally and interestingly, for two generic events A ⊆ E ∈ Σ1, the belief that A has probability α
given the E can be expressed as the likelihood judgement A × Ω2 ≡ E × T, where T is again any
random event with π2 (T)=α.19
The example of an external randomization device is also important because it counters the po-
tential impression that convex-rangedness is an empirically rather restrictive assumption, in that it
is evidently possible to embed any coherent likelihood relation in a larger likelihood relation on a
larger state-space that incorporates the device.
2.6 Coherence and Consistency: Deductive Closure versus Non-Contradiction
By requiring deductive closure under inferences from the logic of probability, coherence is a strong
notion of epistemic rationality . A weaker notion of “consistency” would merely require the absence
of contradictions with respect to the logic of probability.20 Equipped with a notion of coherence, one
can deﬁne a likelihood relation as consistent if it contains some coherent superrelation. Given the
19Unconditional and conditional probabilities can be expressed as likelihood judgements in a similar manner when-
ever the likelihood relation has a convex-ranged representation. In fact, the possibility of doing so for arbitrary
events is essentially equivalent to the deﬁnition of convex-rangedness, and underscores the need for Equidivisibility
(or something very close to it) to ensure adequate expressiveness of the likelihood relation.
20The notions of coherence and consistency are analogues of the notions of “coherence” and “avoiding sure loss”
for lower previsions deﬁn e di nW a l l e y( 1 9 9 1 ) .
18formal identiﬁc a t i o no fc o h e r e n c ew i t ht h ee x i s t e n c eo fam u lti-prior representation, this amounts
to a formal deﬁnition of D as consistent if and only if there exists a ﬁnitely additive probability
measure π such that, for all A,B ∈ Σ,
A D B implies π(A) ≥ π(B). (4)
It is natural to think of the probabilistic information as presented to the decision maker in the form
of a consistent likelihood relation D (as sketched in the penultimate paragraph of Example 3 above),
and its epistemic content being given by the body of all deductive inferences from it. This can
formally be deﬁned as the smallest coherent superrelation of D denoted by Dcoh. Letting ΠD denote
the set of all priors satisfying (4), it is easily veriﬁed that
A Dcoh B if and only if π(A) ≥ π(B) for all π ∈ ΠD.
If D is equidivisible, in view of Theorem 2, Dcoh coincides with the smallest superrelation satisfying
Transitivity, Positivity, Additivity, Splitting and Continuity Dt&p&a&s&c.M o r e o v e r ,D is consistent
if and only if Dt&p&a&s&c is non-degenerate. We thus have:
Corollary 1 An equidivisible likelihood relation D is consistent if and only if Dt&p&a&s&c is non-
degenerate; in this case Dt&p&a&s&c=Dcoh .
3. DECISION MAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILISTIC BELIEFS
3.1. Likelihood Consequentialism
Consider now a decision maker described by a preference ordering over acts and explicit beliefs
over events. Let X be a set of consequences.A nact is a mapping from states to consequences,
f : Ω → X that is measurable with respect to an algebra of events Σ; the set of all acts is denoted
by F; for simplicity, we will assume all acts to be ﬁnite-valued throughout. A preference ordering %
is a weak order (complete and transitive relation) on F. We shall write [x1 on A1;x2 on A2;...]f o r
the act with consequence xi in event Ai;f o rt h ea c t[ x on A;y on Ac] we will also use the shorthand
xAy. More generally, the act h that agrees with f on A and with g on Ac will be denoted by fAg.
As usual, constant acts [x,Ω] are typically referred to by their constant consequence x.
The DM also has probabilistic beliefs described non-exhaustively by a consistent (typically: co-
herent) comparative likelihood relation D on Σ. The relation D will be referred to as the epistemic
context of the decision situation. Thus, a decision-maker in an epistemic context is described by
19the pair (%,D). A coherent context D will be referred to as convex-ranged if it has a convex-ranged
multi-prior representation on the event-algebra Σ.21
We propose as a fundamental principle of consequentialist rationality that consequence valuations
and likelihood comparisons, when available, should be decisive in determining the ranking of acts;
put somewhat diﬀerently, the judged (comparative) likelihood of events is the only attribute of
events that should matter in comparing the consequence incidences f−1(x)a n dg−1(x)o ft h ev a r i o u s
consequences of diﬀerent acts; other conceivable factors such as familiarity with a type of event or
felt competence in assessing it should not matter rationally. We shall refer to this as the Principle
of Likelihood Consequentialism.
The task is to formalize this principle in terms of axioms on the relation between preferences and
beliefs in maximal behavioral generality, that is in particular: without imposing restrictions on risk-
preferences. By way of motivation, begin by considering preferences over bets, i.e. comparisons of
pairs of the form ([x on A;y on Ac],[x on B;y on Bc]). Here, Likelihood Consequentialism implies
canonically that betting on the weakly more likely event is to be weakly preferred, as expressed by
the following condition. For all A,B ∈ Σ and x,y ∈ X such that x Â y :
[x on A;y on Ac] % [x on B;y on Bc]w h e n e v e rA D B. (5)
Note that condition (5) can be viewed as a unidirectional version of Savage’s behavioral deﬁnition
of revealed likelihood. Condition (5) asks to be complemented by an analogous condition entailing
strict rather than weak preferences. At ﬁrst sight it seems natural to formulate such a condition by
simply replacing D with its asymmetric component B. However, if D is incomplete, the resulting
condition would however be overly restrictive, as illustrated by the following example.22
Example 4. Let X = {x,y} with x Â y, and assume that acts (bets) are ranked according to
the lower probability minπ∈Π π(f−1 (x)) of the superior outcome, i.e. that





21Convex-rangedness can be derived from Theorem 2 if Σ is a σ-algebra. It may also follow from the speciﬁc
structure of the likelihood relation; for example, any superrelation of the ”Anscombe-Aumann relation” DAA in
example 3 has a convex-ranged representation, even though the domain of DAA, the product-algebra Σ1 ×Σ2, is not
a σ-algebra if the generic state space Ω1 is inﬁnite.
22I thank Simon Grant for emphasizing this point.
20Suppose that D is such that there exists an event E with maxπ∈Π π(E) > 0 while minπ∈Π π(E)=0 .
In this case [x on E;y on Ec] ∼ [x on ∅;y on Ω]e v e nt h o u g hE B ∅, violating the envisaged
asymmetric counterpart to condition (5).
The diﬃculty illustrated in Example 4 can be overcome by making use of the uniform (rather
than merely asymmetric) component BB of a coherent likelihood relation deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (Uniformly More Likely) A BB B (“A is uniformly more likely than B”) if and
only if there exists ﬁnite partitions of A and Bc,A= Σi∈IAi and Bc = Σj∈JBj, such that A\Ai D
B ∪ Bj for all ∈ I and j ∈ J.
The following Fact shows that teh deﬁnition indeed capture the notion of “uniformy more likely
events” if the context is in fact coherent and equidivisible.
Fact 3 For any consistent likelihood relation D,A BB B implies minπ∈ΠD [π (A) − π(B)] > 0.
The converse holds if D is coherent and equidivisible.
Deﬁnition 2 leads to the following asymmetric counterpart of condition (5). For all A,B ∈ Σ and
x,y ∈ X such that x Â y :
[x on A;y on Ac] Â [x on B;y on Bc] whenever A BB B. (6)
The following axiom called “Likelihood Consequentialism” extends these conditions to multi-
valued acts. The idea is that if two acts diﬀer only in the states in which two particular consequences
are realized, then the likelihood comparison of the corresponding events is a decisive criterion for
their preference comparison.
Axiom 11 (Likelihood Consequentialism) For all f ∈ F, x,y ∈ X and events A,B ∈ Σ :
i) [x on A\B;y on B\A; f(ω) elsewhere] % [x on B\A;y on A\B; f(ω) elsewhere] if A D B and x % y, and
ii) [x on A\B;y on B\A; f(ω) elsewhere] Â [x on B\A;y on A\B; f(ω) elsewhere] if A BB B and x Â y.
If (%,D)s a t i s ﬁes Likelihood Consequentialism, we shall also say that preferences are compatible
with the context D. Note that, exploiting transitivity and considering the case B = ∅, Likelihood
Consequentialism entails the following weak version of Savage’s axiom P3.
Axiom 12 (Eventwise Monotonicity) For all acts f ∈ F, consequences x,y ∈ X and events
A ∈ Σ :
21i) [x on A;f(ω) elsewhere] % [y on A;f(ω) elsewhere] whenever x % y, and
ii) [x on A;f(ω) elsewhere] Â [y on A;f(ω) elsewhere] whenever x Â y and A BB ∅.
Of particular interest are preferences over acts whose outcomes have well-deﬁned probabilities;
such acts will be called unambiguous. Compatibility of preferences with a convex-ranged likelihood
relation implies probabilistic sophistication of preferences over unambiguous acts in the sense of
Machina-Schmeidler (1992). To make this precise, we need the following deﬁnitions. Say that
B ∈ Σ is unambiguous given A if, for some α ∈ [0,1],π (B)=απ(A) for all π ∈ Π. Let ΛA denote
the family of events B ∈ Σ that are unambiguous given A; clearly, ΛA is closed under ﬁnite disjoint
union and complementation, but not necessarily under intersection. In the terminology of Zhang
(1999), each ΛA is a λ-system with the property that B ∈ ΛA iﬀ B ∩ A ∈ ΛA.A n e v e n t A is
null if A ≡ ∅, or, equivalently, if π(A) = 0 for all π ∈ Π. For any non-null A and any arbitrary
π ∈ Π,l e tπ(./A) denote the restriction of the conditional probability measure π(./A)t oΛA.W e
will say that B is unambiguous if it is “unambiguous given Ω”, and write Λ for ΛΩ, as well as π for
π(./Ω). An act f ∈ F is unambiguous if, for all x ∈ X, {ω ∈ Ω | f (ω)=x} is unambiguous; let
Fua denote their set. A “lottery” q is probability distribution on X with ﬁnite support, and will be
written as q =( qx)x∈X, where qx denotes the probability of obtaining x under q;l e tL denote their
set. The unambiguous act f induces the lottery π ◦f−1 with
¡
π ◦ f−1¢x = π({ω ∈ Ω | f (ω)=x}).





stochastically dominates q strictly if at least one of these inequalities is strict. An ordering %L is
monotone (with respect to stochastic dominance) if, for all p,q ∈ L, p %L q whenever p stochastically
dominates the lottery q, and p ÂL q whenever p stochastically dominates the lottery q strictly.
Deﬁnition 3 (Probabilistic Sophistication on Unambiguous Events) T h ep r e f e r e n c eo r d e r -
ing % is probabilistically sophisticated on unambiguous events if there exists a monotone ordering
%L on L such that, for all f,g ∈ Fua,
f % g if and only if π ◦ f−1 %L π ◦ g−1.
Note that, by the convex-rangedness of D, the mapping f 7→ π ◦ f−1 is onto; the ordering %L in
this representation is therefore uniquely deﬁned. Following Machina-Schmeidler (1992), %L can be
viewed as capturing the decision-makers’ risk preferences that become analytically separate from his
beliefs and, in the present more general context, from his preferences over non-unambiguous acts.
Proposition 1 I ft h ew e a ko r d e r% is compatible with the coherent and convex-ranged likelihood
relation D , it is probabilistically sophisticated on unambiguous events.
22If the set of unambiguous events was an algebra rather than a λ-system, Proposition 1 could be
derived straightforwardly by copying from the proof of Machina-Schmeidler’s (1992) main result.
Their proof does not apply as is, since the set of unambiguous events is not necessarily closed under
intersection. However, convex-rangedness entails “enough” intersection closedness to make use of
their proof nonetheless.23
3.2 Application to Multi-Prior Preferences
Even in very simple cases, the constraints entailed by imprecise probabilistic beliefs are non-trivial.
Consider, for example, the multi-prior model with preferences given by








u(x)π({ω : g(ω)=x}), (7)
for some utility function u : X → R and some closed, convex set of probability measures Ψ;f o r
axiomatizations of the multi-prior model in a Savage context which is pertinent here, see Casadesus
et al. (2000) and Ghirardato et al. (2003). When are multi-prior preferences with representation
(u,Ψ) compatible with imprecise probabalistic beliefs represented by the set Π?T h ea n s w e rt ot h i s
question is not obvious, either on direct “intutitive grounds”, nor given the formal deﬁnition of
compatibility proposed in this paper; whatever the correct answer is, it cannot be taken ready-made
from the literature.
In particular, compatibility with Π (in the sense of this paper) does not imply that Ψ ⊆ Π.T o
see this, consider the singleton case Π = {π},w i t hπ convex-ranged. According to Proposition 1,
Compatibility with D{π} is equivalent to probabilistic sophistication with respect to π. On the other
hand, for Ψ ⊆ Π = {π}, that is: for Ψ to be equal to {π}, preferences must maximize expected
utility. But it is well-known24 that probabilistic sophistication with respect to π does not entail
expected utility maximization in the multi-prior model.
Quite generally, for the “natural characterization” Ψ ⊆ Π to obtain with convex-ranged Π,t h e
decision maker must be an expected utility maximizer with respect to unambiguous acts; more
interestingly, this condition also turns out to be suﬃcient for this characterization.
Proposition 2 Let % be a preference relation with multi-prior representation (u,Ψ) given by (7)
and D be a coherent and convex-ranged likelihood relation with representation Π.T h e n Ψ ⊆ Π if
23Proposition 1 and its proof have sigiﬁcant parallels to a recent (and prior) purely behavioral result of Kopylov
(2003).
24See in particular Marinacci (2002).
23and only if % is compatible with D and satisﬁes Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle P225 on the set of
unambiguous acts Fua.
The characterization of Likelihood Consequentialism in the general multi-prior model without the
assumption of expected utility maximization on unambiguous acts is an interesting open question.
3.3 Likelihood Consequentialism when the Context is Merely Consistent
The behavioral implications of probabilistic beliefs such as Proposition 1 depend crucially on their
coherence. Since coherence is a demanding assumption on the decision-maker’s rationality (or better,
his “epistemic competence”) in view of its built-in deductive closure requirement, from a bounded
rationality perspective it is interesting to study the preference implications of probabilistic beliefs
that are consistent rather than coherent. As the following example shows, this leads to major losses
in the predictive and normative power of Likelihood Consequentialism.
Example 5. Consider a state space with external randomization (Ω1 × Ω2,Σ1 × Σ2)a si n
Example 3. Let DAA the likelihood relation representing the information about the random device,
with π2 denoting the probability measure over random events Σ2.A l s o ,l e tD1 denote a likelihood
relation over Σ1 ×{ Ω2} satisfying all the Savage axioms (axioms 1 through 6) with representing
prior π1. It is easily seen that the coherent hull of the combined relation DAA ∪ D1 denoted by
(DAA ∪ D1)
coh is complete and represented by the product measure π1 × π2. Hence, in view of
Proposition 1, Likelihood Consequentialism applied to the relation (DAA ∪ D1)
coh boils down to
probabilistic sophistication with respect to the measure π1 × π2.
By contrast, Likelihood Consequentialism applied to the relation DAA ∪ D1 entails far less. In
particular, there exist preferences that are separately probabilistically sophisticated over the set of
acts that are measurable with respect to Σ1 ×{Ω2}(=: F1)a n d{Ω1}×Σ2 (=: F2), but that are not
probabilistically sophisticated over F1 ∪ F2.
Fact 4 There exist preference relations that are compatible with the relation DAA ∪ D1 but fail to
be probabilistically sophisticated on F1 ∪ F2.
Fact 4 is veriﬁed in the Appendix. Indeed, the preferences constructed there exhibit the Ellsberg
paradox on F1 ∪ F2. More speciﬁcally, we show that the property asserted by Fact 4 holds for
25Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle P2 is the following condition:
For all acts f,f0,g,g0 ∈ F and all A ∈ Σ, [f on A,g on Ac] % [f0 on A,g on Ac] if and only if [f on A,g0 on
Ac] % [f0 on A,g0 on Ac].
24any non-SEU “second-order probabilistically sophisticated CEU” preference ordering as deﬁned in
Ergin-Gul (2004). Preferences of this kind are paradigmatic examples of the preference- rather than
belief-based account of the Ellsberg paradox that was mentioned in the introduction and will be
discussed further below in section 4.3.
Example 5 shows that probabilistic beliefs lose much of their explanatory/predictive power if they
are allowed to be consistent yet incoherent. The example also shows that in the absence of coherence
t h e r em a yn o tb eaw e l l - d e ﬁned notion of risk. Indeed, it is not even obvious how to deﬁne the set
of unambiguous events without coherence. In the present example, it seems natural to consider at
least all events in the union of Σ1×{Ω2} and {Ω1}×Σ2 as unambiguous. But then preferences over
unambiguous acts are not probabilistically sophisticated.
3.4 An Epistemic Interpretation of the Anscombe-Aumann Framework
Likelihood Consequentialism will now be combined with the mixture-space construction of section
2 to obtain an epistemic interpretation of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework. While this
framework is often used in the analysis of decision making under ambiguity, it is generally viewed
as theoretically less fundamental and transparent than the Savage framework; sometimes it is even
viewed with outright suspicion (see, e.g., Epstein (1999)).
The Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework is distinguished by taking acts to be mappings from
states to probability distributions of consequences, rather than simply as mappings from states to
consequences as in the Savage (1954) framework. These probability distributions are interpreted as
objective probabilities of the realizations of an external random device (“roulette lotteries”) that
is not part of the explicitly modeled state space. We will show that if a preference relation over
Savage acts is compatible with a coherent convex-ranged epistemic context D, it can be canonically
extended to a preference relation over Anscombe-Aumann (AA-) acts over the same state space; in
particular, an external randomization device need not be added.
Formally, an AA-act F is a ﬁnite-valued Σ-measurable mapping from the state space Ω to the
set of probability distributions on X with ﬁnite support L. Let FAA denote the set of such acts.
Denoting elements of ∆(X)b yq =( qx)x∈X, one can write F =[ q1 on A1;q2 on A2;...] in analogy
to the notation for Savage acts. Given a convex-ranged epistemic context D,a n yA A - a c tF can be
identiﬁed with a class [F] of Savage acts by the following stipulation: f ∈ [F] if, for any i such that
25Ai is non-null,
f|Ai is ΛAi-measurable and π(./Ai) ◦ f−1 = qi.26
Thus [F] consists of all Savage acts that yield the consequence probabilities speciﬁed by F as
unambiguous conditional probabilities with respect to the given context.
Preferences over Savage acts % induce a preference relation over AA acts %AA on FAA according
F %AA G :⇔ f % g for some f ∈ [F]a n dg ∈ [G].
If preferences are compatible with the convex-ranged likelihood ordering D, this relation is a well-
behaved, uniquely deﬁned weak order order. This claim is entailed by the following generalization of
Proposition 1. Say that %AA is monotone (with respect to stochastic dominance) if it is monotone
pointwise, i.e. if F %AA G whenever F (ω) stochastically dominates G(ω)f o ra l lω ∈ Ω, and
if F ÂAA G whenever in addition F (ω) stochastically dominates G(ω) strictly on some non-null
event A. Note that monotonicity implies that f ∼AA g for any f,g ∈ [F], since such f,g mutually
stochastically dominate each other.
Proposition 3 If % is compatible with the coherent and convex-ranged likelihood relation D, then
%AA is a uniquely deﬁned monotone weak order on FAA .
A key feature of the above construction is its applicability to general convex-ranged belief contexts;
the existence of an independent random device as implied by Anscombe-Aumann’s (1963) “horse-
lottery” interpretation is not assumed.27 This added generality is of value for example in contexts
of social aggregation, when D is the unanimity relation of individuals’ revealed likelihood relations
as in Example 1 above. Proposition 3 shows that the AA structure comes for free in such settings.
In the special case in which the context represents the independent random device (i.e. if D=DAA),
all information about the underlying Savage preferences is summarized by preferences over the subset
FAA
1 of acts in FAA that depend on the realization of the “generic uncertainty” Σ1 (the outcome of
the horse race) only28. Restricting attention to the AA-acts in FAA
1 has the pragmatic advantage
of a more parsimonious representation; it also allows at a formal level a diﬀerent treatment of the
two diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. For example, Schmeidler’s (1989) comonotonic independence
26More explicityl, the second condition requires that, for any x ∈ X and any π ∈ Π,π(f−1({x}) ∩ Ai/Ai)=qx
i .
27Like Proposition 1, Proposition 3 also applies to superrelations of DAA deﬁned on the product-algebra Σ1 × Σ2
in the context of External Randomization (Example 3).
28Technically, FAA
1 is the subset of Σ1 ×{ Ω2}-measurable acts in FAA.
26axiom is meaningful only restricted to FAA
1 rather than all of FAA.29 While we view the case
of D=DAA as an important special case, the applicability of the general construction to general
convex-ranged likelihood relations has the substantial advantage of not having to assume there to be
anything special about “randomness” as a distinct kind of uncertainty; for example, the construction
applies equally well to superrelations of DAA that incorporate additional “objective” information
or “subjective” beliefs. Thus, our framework is attuned to the traditional Bayesian view that all
probability is of one cloth.
Much of the formal power of the AA framework stems from the existence of a mixture operation
on acts. This operation has a counterpart in the present epistemically enriched Savage framework
as follows. We begin by deﬁning “equal” (“ﬁfty-ﬁfty”) mixtures. Consider f ∈ [F]a n dg ∈ [G]; we
need to deﬁne a class of Savage acts f ⊕ g that is contained in [1
2F + 1
2G]30 with a natural mixture
interpretation. This can be done by borrowing the notion of an independent even-chance event from
section 2.
Deﬁnition 4 (Equal Mixture) h ∈ f ⊕ g if h =[ f on T,g on Tc] for some event T ∈ Λ such
that T ≡ Tc and such that f−1(x) ∩ T ≡ f−1(x) ∩ Tc and g−1(x) ∩ T ≡ g−1(x) ∩ Tc for all x ∈ X.
The restriction on T asserts that T is stochastically independent of the outcome incidences f−1(x)
and g−1(x); this ensures that in fact h ∈ [1
2F + 1
2G], as desired. The deﬁnition of equal mixtures
of Savage acts can be extended to dyadic mixtures αf ⊕ (1 − α)g c o n t a i n e di n[ αF +( 1− α)G]
(with α a dyadic number in (0,1)) in straightforward inductive manner. For example, the mixture
3
4f ⊕ 1
4g can be deﬁned as the composite mixture f ⊕ (f ⊕ g).31
The availability of an interpretable mixture-deﬁnition shows that the formal power of the Anscombe-
Aumann framework can be replicated in the present explicitly epistemic framework. Indeed, the epis-
temic framework is more powerful since it allows to treat all uncertainty on par. This is of advantage
when further belief-based restrictions on preferences are introduced, as illustrated by the compan-
ion papers (Nehring (2001, 2004)). The epistemic framework has also the advantage of greater
29For if comonotonic independence was required of the latter, it would entail full independence, i.e. SEU; this
follows from Sarin-Wakker (1992) and, more directly, Nehring (2004).
30The latter is deﬁned pointwise as usual.
31This construction parallels Ghirardato et al. (2003). Note, however, in the present setting there is no natural
limit construction that would allow one to deﬁne arbitrary real-valued mixtures. However, since the dyadic numbers
are dense in the reals, this does not seem to be problematic if preferences are appropriately continuous. Alternatively,
one could directly deﬁne real-valued mistures by considering independent events T with arbitrary real probabilities
π (T).
27transparency in that all axioms can be formulated as restrictions of preferences over a standard,
conceptually primitive object (i.e. Savage acts), possibly conditioned on epistemic data captured by
the context D, rather than on a complex and, from the present point of view, non-primitive object
such as Anscombe-Aumman acts.32
Earlier representations of the Anscombe-Aumann framework in a Savage setting have been ob-
tained by Pratt-Raiﬀa-Schleifer (1964) and Klibanoﬀ (2001a); in contrast to ours, the former assumes
expected utility maximization, the latter utility sophistication. Our representation is more general
also in that it applies to any convex-ranged context, and therefore does not assume the existence of
a subjective randomization device as given by the context DAA deﬁned in section 2.
Machina’s (2004) work on “Almost-Objective Uncertainty” also reproduces the power of the
Anscombe-Aumann framework in an enriched Savage setting in which the state space has the struc-
ture of a Euclidean manifold; like ours, he does not assume expected utility maximatization on
unambiguous events. Machina derives the existence of “almost” unambiguous and conditionally
unambigiuous events from epistemically motivated restrictions on preferences. However, these as-
sumptions are imposed directly in the form of a smoothness condition, while we model the underlying
beliefs directly as a likelihood relation, and obtain analogous preference restrictions Likelihood Con-
sequentialism. One can show that the epistemic substance of Machina’s preference restrictions can
be modeled via likelihood relations that are “almost” convex-ranged.33
An altogether diﬀerent route to mimicking the Anscombe-Aumann framework in a subjective
setting based on a rich set of consequences rather than states is proposed by Ghirardato et al. (2003);
since the mixture operation in their proposal is deﬁned in utility terms, the implied interpretation of
conditions on AA-preferences in their approach is very diﬀerent from that in the present epistemically
approach.
While these contributions have their distinct merits, none of them shares one key, motivating
32This complexity is a potential source of intransparency. For example, Eventwise Monotonicity of AA-preferences
is much stronger than Eventwise Monotonicity of Savage preferences; moreover, while it does not constrain preferences
over lotteries (constant AA-acts) in the standard product set-up (when imposed on FAA
1 ), it implies the Independence
axiom over lotteries when imposed on FAA.
33We intend to establish a more precise and fruitful connection to Machina’s contribution in future work. While
our derivation is behaviorally general, Machina assumes that preferences are “event-smooth” which is behaviorally
restrictive; event-smoothness excludes, for example, the minimum expected-utility model due to Gilboa-Schmeidler
(1989). Finally, Machina exploits the speciﬁc structure of uniformly continuous densities on the real line (or, more
generally, on Euclidean manifolds); by contrast, our approach is applicable to arbitrary state spaces.
28advantage of the present, epistemic approach, namely its ability to record and derive the implications
of additional beliefs beyond those giving rise to the AA structure in the ﬁrst place.34
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Ordinal vs. Cardinal Information about Consequence Valuations
It might be argued that Likelihood Consequentialism is too weak a rationality criterion since it
exploits ordinal information about consequences only. Indeed, much stronger normative restrictions
can be obtained if one exploits cardinal information about comparisons of utility diﬀerences. A theory
of “Expected Utility in the Presence of Ambiguity” along such lines is developed in the companion
paper Nehring (2004). It is not pursued here, since these stronger constraints on the relation between
preferences and beliefs conﬂict with the desideratum of behavioral generality adopted in this paper.
4.2 Non-Exhaustive vs. Exhaustive Interpretation of Belief Context
Stronger rationality restrictions on behavior can also be derived when the likelihood relation is as-
sumed to be an exhaustive representation of the decision-maker’s beliefs under which incompleteness
of the likelihood relation reﬂects deliberate suspensions of judgement. For it may then be argued
that symmetries in the likelihood relation should be mirrored isomorphically in symmetries in prefer-
ences/choices; see Jaﬀray (1989), Nehring (1991, 2000) and Walley (1991, p. 227-228) for arguments
along these lines. On the more general non-exhaustive interpretation adopted here, these isomor-
phism conditions are inappropriate since subrelations of a given relation may exhibit symmetries
that diﬀer from the original ones.
4.3 State-Dependent Preferences and Intrinsic Event Attitudes
Conversely, Likelihood Consequentialism might be criticized as too strong a rationality require-
ment, for example for reasons of state-dependence of preference. We will however argue that in
many (perhaps in all) cases, such objections can be overcome by a more reﬁned modeling.
For Likelihood Consequentialism to be a normatively compelling axiom, consequences must be
34Recall the discussion at the end of Example 3 above.
29properly individuated, in the sense that a given consequence x is equivalent for the decision-maker
in any state in all valuation-relevant aspects35; we will refer to this as the case of “state-independent
preferences”. State-dependence of preferences can be modeled by including aspects of the state into
the description of the consequences. For example, when states describe the DM’s health, gaining
1000$ when healthy may not be worth as much as gaining 1000$ when sick; this diﬀerence can be
accounted for by distinguishing the consequences (1000$,healthy) and (1000$,sick). In such cases,
one needs to abandon the assumption that the set of possible consequences is identical across states;
that is, one would deﬁne Savage acts as mappings from f : ω →
Y
ω∈Ω
Xω. Note that Likelihood
Consequentialism remains meaningful but loses some power; it becomes vacuous in the limiting case
in which the state-speciﬁc consequence sets Xω are pairwise disjoint.
In the latter case, one arrives at substantive restrictions on preferences by postulating a non-
behavioral judged consequence-ordering %[X] on X = ∪ω∈ΩXω that is suﬃciently rich in indiﬀer-
ences to permit cross-state comparisons of consequences. A number of works on state-dependent
preferences from Fishburn (1973) to Karni (2003) employ (non-behavioral) devices that entail such
an ordering. Likelihood Consequentialism continues to be meaningful, with %[X] taking the role of
%|X .
State-dependence of preference is of interest in the present context especially since it allows to
capture many — and arguably all — instances of an apparent “intrinsic” attitude towards events.
For instance, Chew and Sagi (2003) suggest that decision makers may have a taste for betting on
particular types of events that overrides their likelihood assessments.36 For example, on February 1,
2003, a DM may have attributed equal probability to Saddam Hussein’s surviving a US led invasion of
Iraq, and to the Iraqui soccer team winning against Brazil. However, the DM may have preferred to
bet on the Iraqui soccer team rather than on Saddam Hussein; he may, for example, have expected
taking special joy from winning a bet on an underdog team, but regretting having proﬁted from
an unjust cause. On their face, such preferences might appear to challenge the normative appeal
of Likelihood Consequentialism in that non-likelihood features of events seem to be legitimately
valued by the DM. However, this challenge loses its force once one recognizes that the bets do not
really involve the same (properly individuated) consequences. For the bets clearly entail diﬀerent
psychological outcomes in various states (the joy, the regret); while these matter to the decision
35As argued forcefully by Broome (1991), the validity of any normative axiom hinges on the proper individuation
of consequences.
36Ergin-Gul (2004) make a related argument contrasting objective and subjective probabilities.
30maker, they are not captured by a description (“individuation”) of consequences in terms of net
wealth alone. Again, Likelihood Consequentialism continues to apply once acts are described in
terms of properly individuated consequences.37
4.4 Epistemic Contexts from a Purely Behavioral Viewpoint
We have interpreted the likelihood relation D as describing a (possibly non-exhaustive) list of
the decision-maker’s dispositions to aﬃrm particular likelihood comparisons. From the point of
view of the decision-maker himself, it seems eminently sensible to posit probabilistic beliefs as
distinct entities in this way, for otherwise it is diﬃcult to see how the decision-maker can invoke
particular beliefs as grounds for the evaluation of uncertain prospects. Indeed, a substantial part
of the discipline of “decision analysis” is devoted to articulating the decision-maker’s beliefs and
bringing them to bear on the decision-problem at hand.
By contrast, economics as an empirical discipline takes the point of view of an outside observer. We
would submit that also from this “third-person” point of view, the study of a decision-maker’s beliefs
via direct questioning should not be taboo, notwithstanding its clear limitations38.N o n e t h e l e s s ,i n
contrast to this position, many economists subscribe to the behaviorist view according to which
statements about beliefs as independent propositional attitudes are non-observable and thus lack
empirical content. Does this position render the notion of decision-making in an epistemic context
empirically empty?
37We have appealed to the informal notion of “proper individuation”/“state-independent preferences” without
characterizing it in behavioral terms. This seems unavoidable, since it is unclear what behavioral conditions could
take its place. Clearly, Eventwise Monotonicity is not suﬃcient as a behavioral criterion, since it captures at most
the ordinal implications of state independence. One natural candidate for a suﬃcient condition is the Certainty
Independence condition of Ghirardato et al. (2002), since Certainty Independence secures the separation of a state-
independent utility function from event attitudes in a strong sense; Certainty Independence can be viewed as a cardinal
strengthening of Savage’s axiom P4 (Nehring 2004). However, Certainty Independence or even P4 are not necessary
for state-independence, since P4 may fail due to prize-dependent ambiguity attitudes; see Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) for
a worked-out model with this feature.
Furthermore, adapting a recent argument by Karni (1996), it can be argued that in principle no behavioral condition
can yield more than a “prima-facie” criterion. Roughly speaking, Karni argued that under SEU, preferences identify
statewise utilities only up to positive aﬃne transformations state-by-state; thus, if the “true” consequence utilities
are not constant across states, Savage’s “revealed likelihood” relation diﬀers from the agent’s true likelihood. In the
present setting, this amounts to saying that Likelihood Consequentialism will be violated.
38See also Karni (1996) for a defense of the use of verbal testimony in the decision sciences.
31Evidently Likelihood Consequentialism as a relation between preferences and likelihood judge-
ments loses empirical content once the latter cease to be an empirically meaningful entity on their
own. Empirical content can be regained, however, if Likelihood Consequentialism is absorbed into
ab e h a v i o r a ld e ﬁnition of compatibility with an epistemic context: simply say that a preference re-
lation % satisfy Compatibility-with-D if the pair (%,D)s a t i s ﬁes Likelihood Consequentialism. Here
the likelihood relation is “imputed” by the analyst without any truth-claims regarding the beliefs
as such.
The analogy with continuity conditions on preferences may be helpful. Just as “Compatibility-
with-D” conditions, continuity conditions refer in their statement to an “imputed” topology τ that
is itself not derived from behavior. Just like the truth-value of “continuity-relative-to τ”, that of
“Compatibility-with-D” is determined by preferences alone; the behavioral content of either type of
condition is therefore clear-cut.39
One can summarize this behaviorist use of likelihood relations by saying that the context D
represents an “epistemic constraint on preferences” rather than an independent “epistemic primi-
tive”. From this point of view, results such as Theorem 2 can be viewed as meta-propositions that
demarcate for which relations D the preference condition “Compatibility-with-D” is epistemically
meaningful.
39Indeed, it is easily veriﬁed that, given an ordering over outcomes (constant acts), “Compatibility-with-D” boils




Comparison to Zhang (1999).–
Consider the restriction D|Λ of any likelihood relation D satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2
on Σ to the family of unambiguous events Λ.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,D|Λ is complete (on Λ);Theorem2
implies that D|Λ can be represented by a (dyadically) convex-ranged, ﬁnitely additive set function
π on Λ;m o r e o v e r ,π can be extended to some ﬁnitely additive probability measure π on all of Σ.
Zhang (1999) considered likelihood relations deﬁned on arbitrary given lambda-systems as primi-
tives and characterized those relations that are representable by a convex-ranged, countably additive
set function on Λ. Zhang’s result is a key ingredient in Epstein-Zhang’s (2001) characterization of
revealed unambiguous events discussed below. His result is not directly comparable to the corollary
to Theorem 2 described in the preceding paragraph, as it derives a weaker conclusion from weaker
premises. Zhang’s assumptions on the likelihood relation are weaker in that they apply only to
Λ and not to (an incomplete relation deﬁned on) some super-algebra Σ; on the other hand, his
conclusion is weaker as well in that it does not imply representation by an additive set-function
that can be extended to all of Σ. It is not known under which conditions such an extension exists;
Epstein (1999) and Nehring (1999) provide counterexamples in ﬁnite state-spaces. In cases in which
such an extension does not exist, the likelihoood relation DΛ (viewed as an incomplete relation on
Σ)i sinconsistent in the terminology of section 2.5; by consequence, it stands to reason that such
likelihood relations do not represent a well-deﬁned set of probabilistic beliefs.
Comparison to Epstein-Zhang (2001).–
It is also of interest to compare the present deﬁnition of unambiguous events based on explicit
beliefs Λ (“explicitly unambiguous events”) to the preference-based deﬁnition proposed by Epstein-
Zhang (2001) ΛEZ. A central issue arising from any behavioral deﬁnition is the extent to and sense
in which preferences over unambiguous acts reveal the decision-maker’s unconditional probabilistic
beliefs. Epstein-Zhang (2001) provide a partial answer by showing under certain assumptions on
preferences and a richness assumption on the endogenously deﬁned family ΛEZ that preferences
over unambiguous acts are probabilistically sophisticated with respect to an additive set-function
on ΛEZ.
For simplicity, we shall conﬁne the following discussion to the case of two consequences (#X =
33{x,y} with x Â y). In this setting, the act “betting on A”[ x on A, y on Ac] will be denoted simply
by the set A. Using this notation, an event T is EZ-unambiguous (T ∈ ΛEZ) if, for all A,B disjoint
from T, A % B if and only A + T % B + T,a n di ft h es a m eh o l d sf o rTc instead of T.
Two questions arise naturally. First, if preferences are compatible with explict beliefs, are the
explicitly unambiguous events also EZ-unambiguous; in other words: will “truly” unambiguous
events be revealed as such by the EZ deﬁnition? Not necessarily; indeed, this happens only if
betting preferences and beliefs are related by the following “Union Invariance” condition: for all
T ∈ Λ0 and all A,B disjoint from T, A % B if and only A + T % B + T. While this condition has
intuitive appeal, it is clearly a substantive restriction on ambiguity attitudes.40
Conversely, given a preference relation % with EZ-unambiguous events ΛEZ, does there exist
necessarily exist a coherent epistemic context D compatible with % such that ΛEZ ⊆ Λ,w h e r eΛ
is the family of unambiguous events associated with that context? Again the answer appears to be
negative in general, and is deﬁnitively negative in ﬁnite settings.41 First, in view of the discussion
of Zhang (1999) above, the likelihood relation revealed on ΛEZ may be inconsistent, hence there
simply may not exist any coherent context with associated Λ such that ΛEZ ⊆ Λ and such that
preferences over EZ-unambiguous acts %|ΛEZ are compatible with D . Second, in cases in which such
a context exists, it will contain substantial further likelihood comparisons over ambiguous events,
entailing substantial further restrictions on preferences over bets on ambiguous events. While the
EZ deﬁnition of unambiguous events entails substantial restrictions on these preferences of its own
through the Union Invariance condition, it is not clear and seems a priori doubtful that these would
be strong enough to encompass all of the restrictions entailed by D in general. Thus, it remains
an interesting question for future research under which conditions a DM’s preferences over EZ-
unambiguous events reﬂect genuine (coherent) probabilistic beliefs over these events in the sense of
this paper.
40In a similar vein, Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) have pointed out that the Epstein-Zhang deﬁnition makes substantive
implicit assumptions about the decision-maker’s ambiguity attitudes.
41Note that, the Epstein-Zhang (2001) deﬁnition applies (and is meant to apply by Epstein and Zhang) whether or
not the resulting family ΛEZ is rich; in particular, it applies to ﬁnite state-spaces.
34A2. Proofs
P r o o fo fF a c t1 .
Take any events A1,A2,B 1,B 2 such that A1 + A2 D B1 + B2,A 1 D A2 and B1 D B2, while not
A1 D B2. By completeness, B2 B A1, and thus by transitivity, B2 B A2 and B1 B A1. Thus by
Strong Additivity (Lemma 1), B1 + B2 B A1 + A2, the desired contradiction.
Lemma 1 (Strong Additivity) A D B and C D D such that A ∩ C = B ∩ D = ∅ implies A + C D
B + D; moreover, A + C B B + D if in addition A B B or C B D.
This Lemma is standard in derivations of Savage’s Theorem; our proof is an adaptation of Fishburn
(1970, p. 196). From Additivity, one infers immediately that
A +( C\B) D B +( C\B)=B ∪ C = C +( B\C) D D +( B\C),
hence A+(C\B) D D+(B\C) by transitivity. Applying Additivity and transitivity once more and
noting that B ∩ C is disjoint from both A and D, one obtains the desired conclusion:
A + C = A +( C\B)+( B ∩ C) D D +( B\C)+( B ∩ C)=D + B.
The second part of the Lemma follows from an exactly parallel argument. ¤¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .
Necessity of all axioms is straightforward. For suﬃciency, let E be any non-null event in Σ, and
α =  
2k be any dyadic number. We begin by deﬁning, from likelihood judgments, a family αE of
events A that in the multi-prior representation to be obtained will have the property that, for all
π ∈ Π,π(A)=απ (E). Speciﬁcally, let αE be the set of all A such that there exists a partition of
E into 2k subsets Ai ∈ Σ such that Ai ≡ Aj for all i,j and A =
P
i≤  Ai.
We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 A ∈ 1
2kE if and only if there exists E0 ∈ 1
2k−1E such that A ∈ 1
2E0.
The “only-if” part follows directly from Strong Additivity (Lemma 1).
The “if-part” holds trivially for k =1 . F o rk>1, it is veriﬁed by induction. Suppose it to hold
for k0 = k − 1. Assume that there exists E0 ∈ 1
2k−1E such that A ∈ 1
2E0. Then by the deﬁnition of
1
2k−1E, there exists a partition of E into events {E1,...,E2k−1} such that Ei ≡ Ej for all i,j and
E1 = E0. By Equidivisibility, for each i ≥ 1, there exist events Ei,1 and Ei,2 such that Ei,1 ≡ Ei,2,
Ei,1 + Ei,2 = Ei and E1,1 = A. By Splitting, Ei,m ≡ Ej,m0, and thus A ∈ 1
2kE.
35Lemma 3 αE 6= ∅ for all α ∈ D and all non-null E.
By Equidivisibility and induction on k, the claim follows for α = 1
2k from Lemma 2, hence indeed
for all α =  
2k by the deﬁnition of αE.
Lemma 4 A ∈ 1
2kC, B ∈ 1
2kD, and C D D imply A D B.
For k = 0, the claim is trivial. Suppose it to hold for all k0 <k . By Lemma 2, there exist events
A0 ∈ 1
2k−1C such that A ∈ 1
2A0 and B0 ∈ 1
2k−1D such that B ∈ 1
2B0. By induction assumption
A0 D B0, hence by Splitting A D B.
Lemma 5 For all α,β ∈ D, A ∈ αC, B ∈ βD : α ≥ β and C D D imply A D B.
Write α =  
2k and β =  0
2k with   ≥  0.B yd e ﬁnition, there exist partitions {Ai}i≤2k and {Bi}i≤2kof
C respectively D into 2k equally likely elements such that A =
P
i≤  Ai and B =
P
i≤ 0 Bi. Since
Ai ∈ 1
2kC and Bi ∈ 1
2kD, one has Ai D Bi by Lemma 4. The assertion follows therefore from
repeated application of Strong Additivity.
We are now in a position to construct the mixture-space extension b D of D . Let D denote the
set of dyadic-valued random-variables, D := {Z : Ω → D,Zis Σ-measurable and has ﬁnite range}.
Any ﬁnite-ranged Z can be canonically written as
P
i zi1Ei, where Ei = Z−1({zi}). For any Z =
P
zi1Ei ∈ D, deﬁne




and deﬁne the relation b D on D as follows,
Xb DY iﬀ,f o rs o m eA ∈ [X]a n dB ∈ [Y ],A D B.
To establish various properties of b D, some further auxiliary results are needed.
Lemma 6 For all A,B ∈ [Z]:A ≡ B.
By deﬁnition, A =
P
i Ai and B =
P
i Bi such that Ai,B i ∈ ziEi. By Lemma 5, Ai ≡ Bi. Hence
A ≡ B by Strong Additivity.
Lemma 7 For all α ∈ D, families of mutually disjoint events {Ei}i∈I and families {Ai}i∈I such
that Ai ∈ αEi for all i ∈ I,
P





36Writing α =  
2k, by assumption there exist sets Bij for i ∈ I and j ≤ 2k such that Bij ≡ Bij0
for all i,j,j0,
P
j≤2k Bij = Ei for all i, and
P


















j≤  Bij =
P
j≤  Bj, therefore
P






Lemma 8 i) For all X,Y,Z ∈ D such that X +Z ∈ D and Y +Z ∈ D, there exist A ∈ [X],B∈ [Y ]
and C ∈ [Z] disjoint from A and B such that A + C ∈ [X + Z] and B + C ∈ [Y + Z].
ii) For all X,Y ∈ D such that X + Y ∈ D a n ds u c ht h a tY is measurable w.r.t. the partition
generated by X,a n df o ra l lA ∈ [X], there exists B ∈ [Y ] disjoint from A such that A+B ∈ [X+Y ].
iii) For all X,Y ∈ D such that X + Y ∈ D a n ds u c ht h a tY is measurable w.r.t. the partition
generated by X +Y ,a n df o ra l lC ∈ [X +Y ], there exists B ∈ [Y ] such that B ⊆ C and C\B ∈ [X].
To verify part i), write X,Y and Z (non-canonically) as X =
P





i zi1Di for an appropriate partition {Di} of Ω, and write xi =  i
2ki ,y i =
 0
i




Split Di into 2ki equally likely events {Di1,...,Di2ki},a n ds e tCi :=
P








j= i+1 Dij ∈ yiDi. Note that the sets Ai and Bi are well-deﬁned
since  i +  0
i ≤ 2ki and  i +  00
i ≤ 2ki because X + Z ∈ D and Y + Z ∈ D. Using Lemma 7, one
infers that
P
i Ai ∈ [X],
P
i Bi ∈ [Y ],
P












i (Bi + Ci) ∈ [Y + Z]a sd e s i r e d .
Similar proofs verify parts ii) and iii). As to the former, write X =
P
i xi1Ei in canonical
decomposition. By assumption, Y can be written (non-canonically) as
P
i yi1Ei. Take any A =
P
i Ai ∈ [X]. Since xi + yi ≤ 1 for all i, one can ﬁnd Bi ∈ yiEi such that Ai + Bi ∈ (xi + yi)Ei.
Using Lemma 7, one infers that
P




i (Ai + Bi) ∈ [X + Y ], as
desired.
Finally, to verify part iii), write X +Y =
P
i zi1Ei in canonical decomposition. By assumption, Y
can be written (non-canonically) as
P
i yi1Ei. Take any C =
P
i Ci ∈ [X +Y ]. Since yi ≤ zi for all i,
one can ﬁnd Bi ∈ yiEi such that Ci\Bi ∈ (zi − yi)Ei. Using Lemma 7, one infers that
P
i Bi ∈ [Y ],




i (Ci\Bi) ∈ [X], as desired. ¤
Lemma 9 The relation b D on D is transitive, reﬂexive and satisﬁes the following conditions
1. (Extension) 1Ab D1B if and only if A D B.
2. (Positivity) Xb D0 for all X.
3. (Non-degeneracy) 1b B0.
374. (Weak Homogeneity) Xb DY implies αXb DαY for all α ∈ D.
5. (Additivity) Xb DY if and only if X + Zb DY + Z.
6. (Strong Additivity) Xb DY and X0b DY 0 imply X + X0b DY + Y 0.
7. (Continuity) {(X,Y ):Xb DY } is closed (in D×D ).
Proof. Reﬂexivity, Extension, Positivity, and Non-degeneracy are immediate.
To verify Transitivity,c o n s i d e ra n yX,Y,Z such that Xb DY and Y b DZ. By deﬁnition, there exist
A ∈ [X],B,B0 ∈ [Y ],C ∈ [Z] such that A D B and B0 D C. By Lemma 6, B ≡ B0. Hence by the
transitivity of D,AD C, and therefore Xb DZ as desired.
Weak Homogeneity is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 3 and 5.
To verify Additivity,c o n s i d e ra n yX,Y,Z such that X + Z,Y + Z ∈ D. According Lemma 8i),
there exist A ∈ [X],B∈ [Y ]a n dC ∈ [Z] such that A + C ∈ [X + Z]a n dB + C ∈ [Y + Z]. If
Xb DY,then A D B by Lemma 6, thus A + C D B + C by Additivity of D, and thus X + Zb DY + Z.
Analogously, one obtains Xb DY from X + Zb DY + Z.
Strong Additivity, is proved similarly. In view of Lemma 8i), there exist events A ∈ [X],A 0 ∈ [X0]
such that A + A0 ∈ [X + X0], and events B ∈ [Y ],B 0 ∈ [Y 0] such that B + B0 ∈ [Y + Y 0]. By
Lemma 6, A D B and A0 D B0, whence by Strong Additivity of D,A+ A0 D B + B0,a n dt h e r e f o r e
X + X0b DY + Y 0.
It remains to verify Continuity.W es h a l ls h o wt h a t{(X,Y ):n o tXb DY } is open in D.C o n s i d e r
any X,Y such that not Xb DY .T a k ea n yA ∈ [X],B ∈ [Y ]; clearly not A D B.B yt h eC o n t i n u i t y
of D, there exists K<∞ such that, for any 1
K−events C,D, it is not the case that A ∪ C D B\D.
It suﬃces to show that, for any X0,Y0 such that k X0 − X k≤ 1
K and k Y 0 − Y k≤ 1
K, it is not the
case that X0b DY 0.
To verify this claim, take any X0,Y0 such that k X0−X k≤ 1
K and k Y 0−Y k≤ 1
K. By the Positivity
and Strong Additivity of D, it is without loss of generality to assume that X0 (respectively Y 0)i s
measurable with respect to the partition generated by X (respectively Y ), and that X0 ≥ X and
Y 0 ≤ Y. Then there exist by Lemma 8ii) A0 ∈ [X0 −X]s u c ht h a tA+A0 ∈ [X0]; likewise, by Lemma
8iii), there exist and B0 ∈ [Y − Y 0]a n dB00 ∈ [Y 0]s u c ht h a tB0 + B00 = B. Clearly, A0 and B0 are
1
K−events, and therefore it is not the case that A+A0 D B\B0 = B00. Therefore, in view of Lemma
6, it is not the case that X0b DY 0, as needed to be shown. ¤
Now embed b D (viewed as a subset of D×D)i nB×B,w i t hB := B(Σ,[0,1]), the set of [0,1]−valued
38Σ-measurable functions, endowed with the sup-norm. Since B is the completion of D, and thus B×B
of D×D, the closure clb D of b D in B×Brestricted to D×Dis simply b D, since b D is closed in D×D.
Thus, clb D is an extension of b D, and will be referred to as “b D on B”, or simply also as “b D”i fn o
misunderstanding is possible. Clearly Xb DY if and only if there exist sequences {Xn} and {Yn} in
D converging to X and Y, respectively, such that Xnb DYn for all n.
Say that b D on B satisﬁes Homogeneity if, for all X,Y ∈ B and λ ∈ R++ such that λX,λY ∈ B :
Xb DY if and only if λXb DλY.
Lemma 10 The relation b D on B is transitive, reﬂexive and satisﬁes Extension, Positivity, Non-
degeneracy, Homogeneity, Strong Additivity, Additivity, and Continuity.
Proof. Extension and Non-degeneracy are immediate. Continuity holds by construction.
Positivity and reﬂexivity follows therefore from the corresponding properties of b D on D.
To verify Homogeneity,t a k eX,Y ∈ B and λ ∈ R++ such that λX,λY ∈ B and Xb DY. By
deﬁnition, there exist sequences {Xn} and {Yn} in D converging to X and Y, respectively. Write
λ =  α, with   ∈ N and α ∈ (0,1]. Choose some sequence {αn} in D converging to α such







. This ensures that, for all n, αnXn ∈ D and  αnYn ∈ D.B y W e a k
Homogeneity of b D on D,α nXnb DαnYn for all n. Hence by (  − 1)-fold application of Strong Additivity
of b D on D ,a l s o αnXnb D αnYn for all n. By Continuity on B,  α Xb D αY ,a sd e s i r e d .
To verify Strong Additivity on B,c o n s i d e ra n yX,X0,Y,Y0 ∈ B such that Xb DY and X0b DY 0, and
take sequences {Xn},{X0
n},{Yn} and {Y 0
n} in D converging to X,X0,Y and Y 0, respectively, such
that Xnb DYn and X0
nb DY 0







for all n. Disregarding an initial subsequence if necessary, 1
2Xn + 1
2X0















2Y 0, whence by Homogeneity on B again X + X0b DY + Y 0 as desired.
One direction of Additivity “X+Zb DY +Z whenever Xb DY ” follows directly from Strong Additivity
and reﬂexivity. For the converse, consider X,Y,Z such that Xb DY and X − Z,Y − Z ∈ B. Take
sequences {Xn}, and {Yn} in D converging to X and Y, respectively, such that Xnb DYn for all n.
Let {Zn} be any sequence in D satisfying
Z − max(k X − Xn k,k Y − Yn k)1 −
1
n
1 ≤ Zn ≤ Z − max(k X − Xn k,k Y − Yn k)1.
By construction, {Zn} converges to Z;m o r e o v e r ,Xn−Zn ≥ X− k X−Xn k 1−Zn ≥ X−Z ≥ 0,
and likewise Yn − Zn ≥ 0. Thus Xn − Zn ∈ D and Yn − Zn ∈ D for all n. By Additivity on D,
Xn − Znb DYn − Zn for all n, whence X − Zb DY − Z as desired.
39Finally, to verify Transitivity on B, consider any X,Y,Z ∈ B such that Xb DY and Y b DZ.B y
Homogeneity on B 1
2Xb D1
2Y as well as 1
2Y b D1





Hence by Additivity on B, 1
2Xb D1
2Z, from which one obtains Xb DZ again by Homogeneity on B.
¤
In a ﬁnal step, extend b D on B to the set of all bounded random-variables R := B(Σ,R)b y
deﬁning b D on B(Σ,R) as the unique relation e D on B(Σ,R) that coincides on B with b D on B and
that satisﬁes Additivity and Homogeneity. (The uniqueness of this extension is immediate; existence
follows easily form the Additivity and Homogeneity properties of b D on B). As in section 2.2, say that
ar e l a t i o nb D on R is a coherent expectation ordering if it satisﬁes Transitivity, Reﬂexivity, Positivity,
Non-degeneracy, Homogeneity, Additivity, and Continuity. The following Lemma summarizes the
construction, and follows immediately from Lemma 10.
Lemma 11 The relation b D on R is a coherent expectation ordering satisfying Extension.
The following result establishes the existence of a multi-prior representation for coherent expecta-
tion orderings. Its proof is omitted, as it follows from combining Theorem 3.61 and 3.76 in Walley
(1991); for ﬁnite state spaces, a similar result has also been obtained by Bewley (1986).
Theorem 3 Ar e l a t i o ne D on R is a coherent expectation ordering if and only if there exists a closed
convex set of priors Π such that, for all X,Y ∈ R,
Xe DY if and only if, for all π ∈ Π,E πX ≥ EπY.
The representing Π is unique in K(∆(Σ)).
To complete the proof, apply Theorem 3 to the relation b D on R obtained in Lemma 11. By
Extension, for all A,B ∈ Σ,
A D B iﬀ 1Ab D1B iﬀ, for all π ∈ Π,E π1A ≥ Eπ1B.
Thus Π is indeed a multi-prior representation of D. That it is dyadically convex-ranged is an
immediate consequence of Equidivisibility.
To demonstrate uniqueness, consider any Π0 ∈ K(∆(Σ)) diﬀerent from Π with induced expectation
ordering b DΠ0. From the uniqueness part of Theorem 3, there exist X,Y ∈ R such that Xb DY and
not Xb DΠ0Y ,o rs u c ht h a tXb DΠ0Y and not Xb DY . Consider the former case; the latter is dealt with
symmetrically. By Additivity and Homogeneity, it can be assumed that X,Y ∈ B.B y c o n t i n u i t y ,
40monotonicity, and the density of D in [0,1] it can in fact be assumed that X,Y ∈ D.T a k e a n y
A ∈ [X]a n dB ∈ [Y ]. By Extension, 1Ab ≡X and 1Bb ≡Y, hence Ab DB. By assumption, for some
π ∈ Π0,E πX<E πY ; in view of Lemma 12 just below, π (A) <π(B), contradicting the assumption
that Π0 represents D .





2ki 1Ei and A =
P
i Ai such that Ai ∈  i
2ki Ei. By assumption, one can split each
Ei into 2ki equally likely events {Ei1,...,Ei2ki} such that Ai =
P
j≤ i Eij. For any π ∈ Π0 such
that b DΠ0 = b D,π(Eij)=π(Eij0) for all i,j,j0, hence π(Ai)=  i





2ki π (Ei)=EπX. ¤
P r o o fo fF a c t3 .
Suppose that there exists ﬁnite partitions of A and Bc,A= Σi∈IAi and Bc = Σj∈JBj such that
A\Ai D B ∪ Bj for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J. By consistency, ΠD 6= ∅. For all π ∈ ΠD,π(A\Ai) ≥ π (B)f o r

















By (8), π (B) ≤
#I−1
#I π(A) for all π ∈ ΠD, and thus by (9)
min
π∈ΠD











Conversely, suppose that minπ∈Π [π (A) − π (B)] ≥ 1
2n for some n ∈ N. By Equidivisibility, there
exists partitions of A and Bc into 2n+1 equally likely events {Ai} and {Bj}, respectively. Clearly,
for any π ∈ Π and any i,j, π (A\Ai) − π(B ∪ Bj) ≥ π(A) − π(B) − 1
2n ≥ 0, hence A\Ai D B ∪ Bj
by coherence. ¤
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 1 below.
Lemma 13 If Σ is a σ-algebra and π on Λ is dyadically convex-ranged, then Λ contains an algebra
A on which π is convex-ranged.
Proof. By dyadic convex-rangedness, there exists a nested sequence of algebras {Ak} such that
Ak ⊆ Ak0 whenever k ≥ k0 and such that π(A)= 1
2k for each atom of Ak.
41For any A ∈ Σ, let A[k] denote the largest subset of A that is an element of Ak, and write Ac
[k]for
(Ac)[k] . Let A denote the set of all events A ∈ Σ such that
supkπ(A[k])+supkπ(Ac
[k])=1 . (10)
We need to show A is an algebra contained in Λ on which π is convex-ranged.
1. For any A ∈ A,A∈ Λ with π (A)=supkπ(A[k]).
By deﬁnition, for any π ∈ Π,π (A[k]) ≤ π (A)=1−π(Ac) ≤ 1−π(Ac
[k]). Taking sup’s and account
of (10), it follows that π(A)=supkπ(A[k]), as desired.
2. A is an algebra
Closure under complementation is immediate. To verify closure under intersection, consider A,B ∈
A.
Clearly (A ∩ B)[k] = A[k] ∩ B[k] and (A ∩ B)
c








































= 0. Therefore also
limk→∞ π
³




, as needs to be shown.
3. π is convex-ranged on A.
Take any A ∈ A and any real number α ∈ (0,1) and any A ∈ Σ. Write α as the supremum of an




2j ≥ α. (11)
For any k>1, let A0
[k] = A[k]\A[k−1], and let A0




[k];m o r e o v e r ,A0
[k] is either empty or an atom of Ak.
For each k ≥ 1, and each j ≥ 1, split A0
[k] (if non-empty) into 2j equally likely atoms of Ak+j,
and let Bjk a union of  j such atoms, and Cjk a disjoint union of 2j −  j − 1 such atoms. Clearly,
for given k, the Bjk and Cjk a n db ec h o s e nt ob ei n c r e a s i n gi nk.
Let Bj =
P
k≤j Bjk,B= ∪j=1,..,∞Bj, and likewise Cj =
P
k≤j Cjk,C= ∪j=1,..,∞Cj. Note that































By analogous reasoning, π(Cj)=
¡







and therefore supj→∞ π (Cj)=( 1− α)π (A).
Moreover,
Bc



















=( 1− α)π (A)+( 1− π(A)) = 1 − απ (A). (13)
Combining (12) and (13), it follows that B ∈ A and π (B)=απ(A), demonstrating convex-
rangedness. ¤
Fact 5 If Σ is a σ-algebra, Π is convex-ranged if and only if it is dyadically convex-ranged.
Proof. The only-if part is immediate; to verify the if-part, take any non-null event A ∈ Σ, and
α ∈ (0,1). By Lemma 13 applied to the λ-system ΛA, there exists an event B ∈ ΛA such that
π(B/A)=α, verifying convex-rangedness.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
If Λ is a σ-algebra, or if more generally Λ is an algebra with π convex-ranged, then Likelihood Con-
sequentialism restricted to betting preferences implies that the revealed likelihood relation %  agrees
with D on Λ, and Likelihood Consequentialism for multi-valued acts entails Machina-Schmeidler’s
Strong Comparative Probability axiom. Thus the proof of Machina-Schmeidler’s (1992) Theorem 1,
step 5, and Theorem 2, step 2, can be used verbatim to obtain the desired conclusion.
This can be generalized to the general case in which Λ may fail to be an algebra as follows.
Take any f,g ∈ Fua such that π ◦ f−1 stochastically dominates π ◦ g−1 (weakly or strictly). Let
Bf (respectively Bg or Bf,g) denote the smallest algebra containing all sets of the form f−1(x)
(respectively g−1(x)o rb o t hf−1(x)a n dg−1(x)), and let B0
f,B0
g and B0
f,g denote the families of
their respective atoms. Clearly, all these are ﬁnite due to the assumed ﬁnite-valuedness of f and g.
43For each B ∈ B0
f,g, Lemma 13 delivers the existence of an algebra AB contained in ΛB such that
π(./B) is convex-ranged on AB.L e tA denote the algebra generated by their union, i.e. the family
of all sets of the form
P
B∈B0
f,g AB, where AB ∈ AB.L e tA⊥ the subalgebra of events A ∈ A deﬁned
by the additional condition that π (A/B)=π(A/B0) for all B,B0 ∈ B0
f,g; similarly, let A⊥
f and A⊥
g
subalgebras of events A ∈ A deﬁned by the weaker condition that π (A/B)=π(A/B0) for all those
B,B0 ∈ B0
f,g that are contained in the same atom of B0
f (respectively B0
g). By construction clearly
A⊥
f ⊇ Bf ∪ A⊥ and A⊥
g ⊇ Bg ∪ A⊥.
Moreover, since Bf∪Bg∪A⊥ ⊆ Λ, elementary reasoning shows that both A⊥
f and A⊥
g are contained
in Λ, and that π is convex-ranged on both of these and on A⊥. By the latter, there exists an A⊥-
measurable act h such that π ◦ h−1 = π ◦ g−1, and such that by implication π ◦ f−1 stochastically
dominates π ◦ h−1. By the Machina-Schmeidler argument for algebras (the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o f ) ,
h ∼ g and f % h (respectively f Â h if the stochastic dominance is strict). Hence by transitivity
f % g respectively f Â g. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
“Only if”. Suppose Ψ ⊆ Π.L e t ψ− denote the lower probability with respect to Ψ.E v i d e n t l y ,
ψ
−
|Λ = π, hence % maximizes expected utility on unambiguous acts and therefore satisﬁes the sure-
thing principle on those acts.
To verify Likelihood Consequentialism, take any f ∈ F, x,y ∈ X such that x % y and events
A,B ∈ Σ such that A D B. Let g =[ x on A\B;y on B\A; f(ω) elsewhere] and h =[ x on B\A;y
on A\B; f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] , and let π0 ∈ argminπ∈Ψ
P
x∈X u(x)π ({ω : g(ω)=x}). Since A D B and








u(x)π0 ({ω : g(ω)=x}) ≥
X
x∈X





and thus g % h; the strict part of Likelihood Consequentialism is shown similarly.
“If”. Conversely, suppose that % is compatible with D and satisﬁes Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle
P2 on the set of unambiguous acts Fua. By Savage’s Theorem and Proposition 2, % maximizes
expected utility on unambiguous acts, with ψ
−
|Λ = π.
If not Ψ ⊆ Π, then there must exist A ∈ Σ such that ψ− (A) <π − (A) by the uniqueness part
of Theorem 2. By the convex-rangedness of π, there exists T ∈ Λ such that π (T)=π− (A). Since
T is unambiguous, π+ (T) ≤ π− (A) and thus T E A; on the other hand, since ψ− (T)=π(T)=
44π− (A) >ψ − (A), for any x Â y one has [x on A, y on Ac] ≺ [x on T, y on Tc], violating Likelihood
Consequentialism. ¤
P r o o fo fF a c t4 .
Let u : X −→ R a non-constant function, φ be a strictly increasing mapping from [0,1] onto itself,
and υ : Σ1 → [0,1] the capacity φ ◦ π1. Any act f can be written as [xi,j on Ai × Tj]i,j.D e ﬁne




where i(ω) is given as the unique i such that
Ai 3 ω. Now deﬁne % as follows: by setting





where the integral is the Choquet integral. The preference relation % can be viewed as a special
case of the CEU model due to Schmeidler (1989) adapted to a Savage framework. In fact, (14)
deﬁnes exactly the class of “second-order probabilistically sophisticated CEU” preferences studied
in Ergin-Gul (2004).
It is clear that % is probabilistically sophisticated on F1 ∪ F2 if and only if φ = id, i.e. υ = π1,
in which case it is SEU. Likelihood Consequentialism with respect to DAA is immediate from the
construction. To verify Likelihood Consequentialism with respect to D1, consider any A0,B0 ∈ Σ1
such that A := A0 × Ω2 D B := B0 × Ω2,f∈ F and x,y ∈ X such that x % y.S e t t i n g g =[ x
on A\B;y on B\A; f elsewhere] and h =[ x on B\A;y on A\B; f elsewhere], note that, in act
notation, Zg =[ u(x)o nA0\B0;u(y)o nB0\A0;Zg elsewhere] and Zh =[ u(x)o nB0\A0;u(y)o n
A0\B0;Zg elsewhere]. Since π1 (A0) ≥ π1 (B0) by assumption, one has
υ({ω} : Zg (ω) ≥ z) ≥ υ({ω} : Zh (ω) ≥ z)




Zhdυ by the deﬁnition of the Choquet integral, verifying the
weak part of Likelihood Consequentialism with respect to D1; the strict part is veriﬁed analogously.
¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
The relation %AA is uniquely deﬁned since convex-rangedness of the context ensures that [F]i s
non-empty.
Consider any F and G such that F (ω) stochastically dominates G(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.T a k e a n y
partition {Ai}1,..,n such that both F and G are measurable with respect to this partition. For
45i =0 ,..,n,d e ﬁne AA acts Fi =[ F (ω)o n
P
j≤i Aj,G (ω)o n
P
j>iAj], and take Savage acts
fi ∈ [Fi]. By Proposition 1, for i ≥ 1,f i % fi−1. Since by construction f0 ∈ [G]a n dfn ∈ [F], by
transitivity of % one infers that F %AA G, demonstrating the “weak” part of monotonicity. The
strict part follows from an analogous argument.
Completeness of %AA is an immediate consequence of the completeness of %. To verify transitivity,
assume that [F] %AA [G]a n d[ G] %AA [H]. By deﬁnition of [.], there exist f ∈ [F],g,g0 ∈ [G],h∈ [H]
such that f % g and g0 % h. Note that since g,g0 ∈ [G], they stochastically dominate each other,
and therefore g ∼ g0, whence by transitivity of %,f% h, as needed to be shown. ¤
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